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INTRODUCTION 
Unsurprisingly, the copy is a central concept in the copyright system.  
Copyrights originally conferred control over the creation and disposition of 
copies by granting exclusive rights to print and publish books.1  Of course, 
copyright no longer confines itself to regulating printing and publishing.  
Modern copyright has grown to embrace exclusive rights to display, per-
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1
  See LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 46–48 (1968) (describing 
the control the Stationers‘ monopoly afforded over publication and disposition of copies in sixteenth and 
seventeenth century England).  In 1710, the Statute of Anne extended to authors the ―sole liberty of 
printing and reprinting‖ copies of their books and prohibited unauthorized sale and publication of the 
same.  1710, 8 Ann., c.19 (Eng.).  In the United States, the Copyright Act of 1790 provided copyright 
holders ―the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending‖ books, maps, and 
charts.  Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). 
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form, and adapt works of authorship of all sorts.2  Nonetheless, copies re-
main crucial to both the establishment and infringement of copyright inter-
ests.3 
Despite this ongoing significance, copyright law has been slow to re-
solve the challenges that digital technologies pose for our deeply analog 
understanding of the copy.  For most of the history of copyright law, copies 
were the exception rather than the rule.  But in the digital era, copies are not 
just prevalent, they are pervasive.  As a result, copyright law has expanded 
from a regulation of the publishing trade to a palpable presence in our daily 
lives.4  More fundamentally, these technologies expose a deeper ontological 
problem for copyright law.  Because copies are no longer capable of simple 
and uncontroversial definition, copyright law often lacks the facility to de-
termine whether a copy exists. 
The use of digital technology typically entails the creation of tempo-
rary instantiations of copyrighted works.5  Launching a software applica-
tion, browsing the Internet, or sending an email results in the creation of at 
least one, and often several, potential copies in the random access memory 
(RAM) of computing devices.  This constant stream of instantiations of co-
pyrighted works has outstripped the traditional conception of the copy, one 
rooted in the concrete and tangible paradigm of an enduring bound volume.  
Copyright applies this increasingly anachronistic conception to digital tech-
nologies only through significant contortions. 
Scholars, courts, and policymakers have struggled for decades to re-
concile the traditional understanding of the copy with the technological de-
velopments that threaten to undermine it.  Yet this central dilemma remains 
unresolved.  Courts, chief among them the Ninth Circuit in MAI Systems 
Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., have largely adopted a broad and inclusive 
RAM copy doctrine that treats all temporary digital instantiations as copies 
under the Copyright Act.6  Scholars, however, have criticized the logical 
underpinnings and policy implications of Peak with striking consistency.7 
 
 
 
2
  17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (enumerating the classes of works protected by copyright); id. § 106 
(enumerating the exclusive rights granted to copyright holders). 
3
  See infra Part III.A for a discussion of the importance of the definition of ―copies‖ in establishing 
infringement. 
4
  See John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH 
L. REV. 537, 543–48 (describing the increasing presence of copyright law in the daily activities of aver-
age citizens).  
5
  The term ―copy‖ is often used in a nontechnical sense to refer to any representation of a work.  But 
the designation ―copy‖ is a term of art defined by the Copyright Act.  See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defin-
ing ―copies‖).  The central question this Essay addresses is the extent to which data stored in RAM con-
stitutes a copy in this strict sense.  To avoid unnecessary confusion in terminology, this Essay uses the 
term ―instantiation‖ to refer to a representation of a work when its status as a copy is open to debate, and 
the term ―copy‖ to refer to representations that meet the statutory definition in the Copyright Act. 
6
  991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993). 
7
  See infra Part I.B. 
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The Second Circuit‘s recent decision in Cartoon Network v. CSC Hold-
ings, which held that CSC did not create copies when it buffered segments 
of television programs,8 promises not only to reignite the longstanding con-
troversy over the RAM copy doctrine, but also to reframe a debate that has 
ossified over the past two decades.  Cartoon Network departs from the do-
minant trend by insisting that some temporary instantiations are simply too 
evanescent to qualify as copies.9  By rejecting a broad reading of Peak, Car-
toon Network shifts the debate from one that revolves around Peak‘s pro-
priety to one that squarely acknowledges the difficulty of distinguishing 
copies from non-copies.  But Cartoon Network ultimately fails to fully arti-
culate a generalizable approach to analyzing temporary instantiations, care-
fully limiting its holding to the specific facts before it.  Nonetheless, by 
prompting the debate to move beyond the re-litigation of Peak, Cartoon 
Network could reinvigorate the effort to digitize copyright‘s conception of 
the copy. 
This Essay proceeds in three parts.  Part I traces the development of the 
RAM copy doctrine and the criticisms leveled against it.  It begins with 
MAI v. Peak, the case that originated the doctrine and has largely framed 
subsequent debate.  Although Peak is susceptible to a more restrained read-
ing, most courts have interpreted the case to stand for a categorical and in-
flexible rule that all RAM instantiations qualify as copies.  As a result, Peak 
has faced sustained criticism for its interpretation of the Copyright Act, its 
legislative history, and relevant precedent.  Further, Peak‘s critics have con-
sistently warned of the practical implications of a broad treatment of RAM 
copies, among them the sweeping expansion of copyright holder control 
over private uses of lawfully acquired copies. 
Part II explores the Second Circuit‘s break from Peak‘s now dominant 
approach to temporary instantiations.  While rhetorically minimizing its de-
parture, the court in Cartoon Network discarded the broad RAM copy doc-
trine in favor of an inquiry more attuned to specific factual allegations of 
RAM copying.  This approach avoids many of Peak‘s difficulties, but in-
troduces a new set of concerns.  Although Peak led courts to an over-
inclusive understanding of RAM copies, it offered both clarity and predic-
tability.  Cartoon Network better reflects the text of the Copyright Act, but 
offers future courts little guidance and unsettles expectations about the 
treatment of RAM instantiations without fully outlining a rule to replace 
Peak. 
Part III takes up the challenge of developing a set of criteria for relia-
bly identifying RAM copies.  It begins by scrutinizing a shared assumption 
of both Peak and Cartoon Network—that the statutory definitions of ―cop-
ies‖ and ―fixed‖ are the appropriate starting point for analyzing RAM in-
stantiations.  Although these definitions were drafted to clarify the scope of 
 
 
 
8
  536 F.3d 121, 129–30 (2d Cir. 2008). 
9
  Id.   
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copyrightable subject matter, an understanding of the various ways in which 
copyright concerns itself with ―copies‖ suggests that these definitions are 
nonetheless relevant in the infringement context.  Governed by these defini-
tions, the RAM copy question turns largely on the meaning of ―transitory 
duration,‖ a concept courts have had few opportunities to interpret.  Al-
though precise delineation is difficult, this Part considers three sets of con-
siderations that shed light on the scope of ―transitory duration‖: its 
application in the context of copyrightability; qualitative considerations re-
lated to the function of RAM instantiations; and the extent to which RAM 
instantiations serve as functional substitutes for traditional copies from the 
perspective of the reproduction right.  Taken together, these considerations 
reveal an understanding of RAM instantiations that is at once more defensi-
ble than Peak and more predictable than Cartoon Network. 
I. THE RISE OF THE RAM COPY DOCTRINE 
For digital works to be displayed, performed, or manipulated by a 
computing device, they must be rendered in memory.  This characterization 
is equally true of computer programs and digital representations of text, im-
ages, and music.  Every commonplace interaction with digital information 
depends on that information being loaded into RAM.10  When you read 
Pride and Prejudice and Zombies on your Kindle, listen to ―White 
Freightliner Blues‖ on your iPod, or—as is sometimes necessary—launch 
Microsoft Word, an instantiation of those copyrighted works is created in 
RAM. 
Disputes over the copyright status of these instantiations were inevita-
ble.  Copyright holders claim that RAM instantiations are copies within the 
purview of their exclusive rights and, as a result, can be created only to the 
extent licensed.11  Users of copyrighted works maintain that RAM instantia-
tions are too impermanent to qualify as copies.  As described below, the 
Ninth Circuit sided with the copyright holders in MAI v. Peak, the first case 
to directly address this debate.  In time, Peak came to stand for the notion 
that all RAM instantiations, however fleeting, are copies.  As this rule was 
 
 
 
10
  RAM differs from more permanent means of digital storage in several ways.  RAM relies on elec-
trical impulses to store data, in contrast to more stable magnetic or optical media.  See Bradley J. Ni-
cholson, The Ghost in the Machine: MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc. and the Problem of 
Copying in RAM, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 147, 149 (1995).  As a result, RAM is volatile.  Data stored in 
RAM is lost when a computer is powered off.  Id.  RAM also tends to be more expensive and less abun-
dant than hard disk space or other media of long-term storage.  Id.  
Modern RAM is dynamic, meaning that its data must be continually refreshed and overwritten in or-
der to remain usable.  SCOTT MUELLER, UPGRADING AND REPAIRING PCS 419 (2003) (describing dy-
namic RAM as the main memory in a modern PC).  Static RAM (SRAM) technology, which does not 
require constant refreshing of data, generally is not used as the primary memory in personal computers 
or other applications requiring large amounts of memory.  Id. at 419–20. 
11
  See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006) (providing copyright holders the exclusive right, subject to various 
exceptions and limitations, to reproduce copies of their works). 
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embraced by a growing majority of courts, Peak‘s critics took pains to de-
tail its many flaws. 
A. MAI v. Peak & Its Progeny 
As early as 1961, the copyright system encountered challenges posed 
by software and computer technology.12  But rather than directly confront-
ing these challenges in the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress deferred.13  It 
turned to the expertise of the National Commission on New Technological 
Uses of Copyright Works (CONTU), a body empanelled to study these 
challenges and offer legislative recommendations.14  In response to 
CONTU‘s final report,15 Congress enacted the Computer Software Act of 
1980, explicitly recognizing computer programs as copyrightable subject 
matter.16  
Despite this confirmation of computer programs as copyrightable 
works, courts did not directly confront the question of RAM instantiations 
until more than a decade later in MAI v. Peak.17  MAI manufactured and 
serviced a line of computers.18  Like many computer manufacturers of the 
time, MAI developed its own operating system software for its machines.  It 
likewise created diagnostic software, used to aid in servicing MAI ma-
 
 
 
12
  See George D. Cary, Copyright Registration and Computer Programs, 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT 
SOC‘Y 362, 363 (1964) (noting the first effort to deposit a computer tape for copyright registration in 
1961).  Despite statutory and constitutional doubts, the Copyright Office began accepting registration 
applications for computer programs under its ―rule of doubt‖ in 1964.  See Pamela Samuelson, CONTU 
Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 
1984 DUKE L.J. 663, 692–94. 
13
  See 17 U.S.C § 117 (Supp. I 1977).  Prior to its amendment in 1980, § 117 provided: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 through 116 and 118, this title does not afford to 
the owner of copyright in a work any greater or lesser rights with respect to the use of the work in 
conjunction with automatic systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, or transferring in-
formation, or in conjunction with any similar device, machine, or process, than those afforded to 
works under the law, whether title 17 or the common law or statutes of a State, in effect on De-
cember 31, 1977, as held applicable and construed by a court in an action brought under this title.  
Id. 
14
  See National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Pub. L. No. 93-
573, 88 Stat. 1873, 1873–74 (1974) (authorizing the creation of the Commission and empowering it to 
study and report on computer-related uses of copyrighted works as well as the use of photocopiers). 
15
  See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL 
REPORT (1979) [hereinafter CONTU]. 
16
  Patent and Trademark Laws Amendment Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 117, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 
(1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1982)) (adding a statutory definition of ―computer program‖ 
to § 101 and substituting a new § 117, which permits owners of copies of computer programs to modify 
them and create archival copies). 
17
  See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., No. CV 92-1654-R, 1992 WL 159803 (C.D. Cal. 
Apr. 14, 1992), aff‟d 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).  Earlier courts noted the differences between RAM 
and other forms of memory without reaching the RAM copy question.  See Apple Computer, Inc. v. 
Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 n.3 (3d Cir. 1983) (contrasting RAM with ―permanent 
memory devices‖). 
18
  Peak, 1992 WL 159803, at *1–3. 
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chines.  Peak offered competing repair and maintenance services for MAI 
computers.19 
MAI filed suit against Peak, alleging copyright infringement premised 
on Peak‘s use of MAI‘s operating system and diagnostic software while 
servicing customer computers.20  According to MAI, each time a Peak em-
ployee loaded the MAI operating system or diagnostic software on a cus-
tomer‘s machine, a copy was created in RAM.  Because the license 
agreement that governed the use of MAI software did not permit copying 
by third parties like Peak, MAI maintained that these copies were unautho-
rized.21  The district court agreed, permanently enjoining Peak from loading 
MAI software into the ―electronic random access memory of the central 
processing unit of a computer system.‖22 
On appeal, Peak argued that the RAM instantiations created when its 
technicians booted MAI computers or launched the diagnostic program did 
not constitute copies because they were not fixed.23  The Copyright Act de-
fines copies as ―material objects . . . in which a work is fixed by any method 
now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 
machine or device.‖24  An instantiation of a work is a ―copy‖ only to the ex-
tent it is ―fixed‖—that is to say, ―when its embodiment . . . is sufficiently 
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.‖25 
Acknowledging the governing statutory definitions, the Ninth Circuit 
reasoned that because the temporary instantiations created by Peak enabled 
its technicians to view an error log generated by the diagnostic program, 
those instantiations were fixed, and thus qualified as copies.  According to 
the court, if RAM instantiations can be perceived, reproduced, or communi-
cated, they are copies.26  
The Ninth Circuit‘s decision in Peak is susceptible to two interpreta-
tions that give rise to two competing variations of its RAM copy doctrine.  
On one hand, Peak could stand for the proposition that instantiations of 
works in RAM can serve as copies so long as the particular facts at issue 
demonstrate that the statutory definitions are satisfied.  While room remains 
to take exception to Peak‘s interpretation of those definitions and their ap-
 
 
 
19
  Id. at *7. 
20
  Id. at *8. 
21
  A representative MAI software license provided that ―customer[s] may give access to the initial 
software only to the following: (i) bona fide employees of customers who agree to be bound by these 
terms and conditions; (ii) representatives of MAI; and (iii) others authorized by MAI in writing.‖  Id. at 
*2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
22
  Peak, 991 F.2d at 515. 
23
  Id. at 518. 
24
  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
25
  Id. 
26
  Peak, 991 F.2d at 519. 
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plication to the facts, this reading suggests only that instantiations of works 
incidental to digital technologies are as capable of classification as copies as 
those occurring in any other medium.  Considering that the Ninth Circuit 
was addressing a question of first impression, this fact-dependent variant of 
the RAM copy doctrine appears relatively benign as a first step towards a 
general rule.  Some courts have embraced this limited treatment of Peak 
and the soft RAM copy doctrine it yields.27 
But this context-sensitive RAM copy rule is difficult to square with the 
text of Peak.  In two passages, the court appears to couch its rule in fact-
dependent terms.28  These statements, however, only marginally cabin the 
scope of the court‘s holding.  While it recites selected findings of fact, the 
court failed to connect them to the statutory durational requirement.  Else-
where the court suggested, in sweeping terms, that copying ―occurs when a 
computer program is transferred from a permanent storage device to a com-
puter‘s RAM‖29 and endorsed the district court‘s generalized conclusion 
that ―the loading of copyrighted computer software from a storage medium 
(hard disk, floppy disk, or read only memory) into the memory of a central 
processing unit (‗CPU‘) causes a copy to be made.‖30  In light of these fac-
tually unmoored conclusions, the soft RAM copy doctrine requires future 
courts to fill in significant factual gaps in the Ninth Circuit‘s reasoning if 
they hope to determine whether particular RAM instantiations constitute 
copies.  The necessity of this interpolation invites a less strained and more 
expansive reading of Peak‘s RAM copy doctrine. 
Not surprisingly, most courts that have applied Peak give its core hold-
ing a broader thrust.  These cases suggest a rule far less concerned with the 
factual niceties of particular cases, opting instead for clarity and simplicity.  
This hard RAM copy doctrine holds that all temporary digital instantiations 
of copyrighted works are copies.  It is this unequivocal statement of Peak‘s 
 
 
 
27
  See, e.g., London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 175 n.29 (D. Mass. 2008) 
(citing Peak, 991 F.2d at 518–19) (recognizing ―that electronic copies can be of varying permanence, 
and it is not clear that all of them should be treated equally under the copyright statutes‖ (citation omit-
ted)); Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat‘l Ass‘n of Fire Equip. Distribs. & Nw. Nexus, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 
1177 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (stating that Peak ―found that the . . . program . . . was ‗fixed‘ in RAM because the 
computer user was able to view a representation of the program‘s information‖); Advanced Computer 
Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 363 (E.D. Va. 1994) (suggesting that RAM instantiations 
persisting for ―seconds or fractions of a second . . . arguably would be too ephemeral to be considered 
‗fixed‘ or a ‗copy‘‖ while those persisting for ―minutes or longer‖ are copies); see also Cartoon Network 
v. CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121, 128 (2d Cir. 2008) (interpreting Peak to be premised on the assumption 
that RAM instantiations persisted for several minutes). 
28
  First, the court stated that the RAM instantiations were copies because Peak could ―view the sys-
tem error log and diagnose the problem with the computer.‖  Peak, 991 F.2d at 518.  In another formula-
tion, the court explained that because those instantiations could be ―perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, . . . the loading of software into the RAM creates a copy under the Copyright Act.‖  Id. 
at 519 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
29
  Id. at 518. 
30
  Id. 
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holding that has come to dominate the judicial understanding of temporary 
instantiations.31 
Numerous opinions have mechanically applied Peak, typically with lit-
tle regard to their particular facts.32  In a subsequent case dealing with 
another independent service provider, the Ninth Circuit cast its earlier hold-
ing in Peak in fact-independent terms.33  Subsequent decisions have ex-
tended Peak, with a similar disregard for its facts, to scenarios and legal 
theories well beyond its original context.  Direct and indirect liability for 
websites and electronic bulletin boards,34 the scanning of copyrighted pho-
tographs,35 and the development of interoperable software36 have all fallen 
within the ambit of Peak. 
 
 
 
31
  The Ninth Circuit has implicitly called into question its reasoning in Peak on at least one occa-
sion.  The Copyright Act does not require that derivative works be fixed in order to infringe.  But deriva-
tives must meet a related, if less exacting, standard: they ―must incorporate a protected work in some 
concrete or permanent ‗form.‘‖  Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967 
(9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a device that altered the gameplay of video games did not give rise to de-
rivative works).  Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit distinguished alterations it deemed sufficiently perma-
nent to constitute derivative works from the impermanent displays at issue in Galoob on the grounds that 
those displays ―were not incorporated in any permanent form; when the game was over, they were 
gone.‖  Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1998).  The court‘s willingness to 
rely on the temporary and volatile nature of an instantiation to resolve the derivative work question is 
difficult to reconcile with Peak‟s blindness to the similar considerations. 
32
  Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assocs., 144 F.3d 96, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (interpreting Peak as 
holding that ―RAM reproduction constitutes a copy‖); FM Indus., Inc. v. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., 
No. 07 C 1794, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20670, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2008) (citing Peak for the 
proposition that ―a user reproduces a program . . . merely by launching that program, thereby causing the 
computer to copy it to [RAM]‖); Iconix, Inc. v. Tokuda, 457 F. Supp. 2d 969, 995 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (in-
terpreting Peak as holding that ―running copyrighted software, without ownership of the copyright or a 
license to run the software, constitutes copyright infringement‖); CSU Holdings, Inc. v. Xerox, 910 F. 
Supp. 1537, 1541 (D. Kan. 1995) (relying on Peak for the notion that transferring a program from sto-
rage to RAM creates a copy); Tricom, Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 902 F. Supp. 741, 745 (E.D. Mich. 
1995) (citing Peak for the proposition that copying occurs any time a computer program is transferred 
from storage to RAM). 
33
  Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1333–34 (9th Cir. 1995) (reiterating Peak‘s 
holding ―that the loading of MAI‘s operating system software into RAM makes a ‗copy‘ under the Cop-
yright Act‖). 
34
  See Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1294 (D. 
Utah 1999) (holding that browsing an infringing website created RAM copies sufficient to support a 
claim of contributory infringement for one who provides links to that site); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. 
Webbworld Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543, 551 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (citing Peak as ―holding that copying occurs 
when a computer program is transferred from a permanent storage device to a computer‘s random access 
memory‖); Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 931 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (citing Peak to support its 
conclusion that copying occurs when a program is transferred from storage to RAM); Religious Tech. 
Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc‘n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (suggesting 
that under Peak ―the loading of data from a storage device into RAM constitutes copying because that 
data stays in RAM long enough for it to be perceived‖). 
35
  See Tiffany Design, Inc. v. Reno-Tahoe Specialty, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1120–21 (D. Nev. 
1999) (relying on Peak in holding that the scanning of a copyrighted image into RAM constituted a re-
production). 
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Equally importantly, these cases reflect a substantive hardening of 
Peak‘s central holding.  In its simplest form, the rule that emerges from 
Peak‘s progeny is ―RAM reproduction constitutes a copy.‖37  Other courts 
have explicitly rejected the notion that the duration of temporary instantia-
tions factors into the analysis.38  In perhaps the broadest reading of Peak, 
one court offered this take: ―digitization or input of any copyrighted materi-
al, whether it be computer code or visual imagery, may support a finding of 
infringement notwithstanding only the briefest of existence in a computer‘s 
RAM.‖39  To the extent the Ninth Circuit‘s holding in Peak was checked by 
its factual record, most cases have ignored any such restraint.  The most 
probable and prevalent reading of Peak, therefore, is one that treats all tem-
porary instantiations incidental to digital technologies as copies.  Over time, 
both courts and policy makers have begun to regard Peak as settled law.40  
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit‘s analysis has proven fertile ground for criti-
ques of both its reasoning and policy implications. 
B. The Problems with Peak 
Criticism of Peak takes two basic forms.  First, Peak‘s detractors have 
taken aim at its mischaracterization of the text and legislative history of the 
Copyright Act, as well as the relevant case law.  Second, commentators 
have questioned the policy implications of Peak‘s treatment of temporary 
instantiations.  These critiques call into question both the logic and the wis-
dom of Peak‘s RAM copy doctrine and belie the casual pronouncements by 
courts and policymakers that Peak should be treated as received text. 
 
1. Peak‟s Interpretive Failings.—Perhaps the most glaring weakness 
of Peak‘s reasoning is its inattentiveness to the text of the Copyright Act.  
By tethering its conclusion solely to the fact that Peak technicians could 
                                                                                                                           
36
  See MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm‘t, Inc., No. CV-06-2555-PHX-DGC, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 53988, at *19–21 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008) (granting summary judgment on contributory copy-
right infringement claim against developer of interoperable software premised on creation of unautho-
rized RAM copies by end users); Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Techs., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 
1116–17 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that the plaintiff had demonstrated it would likely succeed on claims 
for direct and contributory copyright infringement against developer of automated ticket purchasing 
software for creating unauthorized RAM copies of ticket vendor‘s website). 
37
  Stenograph, 144 F.3d at 102. 
38
  As one court opined, ―in making a copy, even a temporary one, the person who [did so] in-
fringe[d] the copyright.‖  Intellectual Reserve, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 1294; see also Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. 
Express Co., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1239, 1240 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (citing Peak ―for the more general proposition 
that ‗a copy made in RAM is ―fixed‖ and qualifies as a copy under the Copyright Act‘‖). 
39
  Tiffany Design, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1121 (emphasis added). 
40
  See BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION 
INFRASTRUCTURE 65 (1995) (describing Peak‘s holding ―that booting a PC involves copying‖ as ―unex-
ceptional‖).  But see James Boyle, Intellectual Property Policy Online: A Young Person‟s Guide, 10 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 47, 68–69 (1996) (disputing Lehman‘s characterization). 
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perceive the output of MAI‘s software, the court ignored the requirement 
that an instantiation persist ―for a period of more than transitory duration.‖41  
Rather than grappling with the admittedly difficult task of divining the line 
separating fleeting instantiations from fixed copies, Peak simply disre-
garded the text, effectively reading the independent durational requirement 
out of the statute altogether.  While this approach may simplify the inquiry, 
it does violence to the text of the Act and the intent of Congress. 
The Ninth Circuit‘s selective approach to the available interpretative 
tools extended to legislative history as well.  To support its holding, the 
Peak court relied on CONTU‘s assertion that ―the introduction of a work 
into a computer memory would, consistent with the [current] law, be a re-
production.‖42  The court‘s reliance on this statement is problematic for at 
least three reasons.  First, as Peak acknowledged, the CONTU report‘s ref-
erence to memory is ambiguous.43  It could refer to stable and undoubtedly 
fixed read only memory (ROM) and hard disk storage or to more volatile 
RAM.44  Second, since Congress enacted no legislative changes in response 
to the report‘s characterization, this isolated statement lacks authoritative 
weight.45  Third, and most importantly, this statement appears to contradict 
prior controlling congressional statements on the scope of fixation.  As the 
House Report on the Copyright Act of 1976 explained: ―[T]he definition of 
‗fixation‘ would exclude from the concept purely evanescent or transient 
reproduction such as those projected briefly on a screen, shown electroni-
cally on television or other cathode ray tube, or captured momentarily in 
the „memory‟ of a computer.‖46  Admittedly, decades-old legislative history 
from a Congress that, by its own admission, was hesitant to legislate in the 
nascent realm of digital copyright should not be regarded as dispositive.47  
 
 
 
41
  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
42
  CONTU, supra note 15, at 40. 
43
  MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993) (―recogniz[ing] 
that these authorities are somewhat troubling‖ because they do not distinguish between RAM, hard 
disks, or ROM). 
44
  See Boyle, supra note 40, at 93–94; Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on 
the Information Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345, 354 n.47 (1995).  
45
  See Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 
42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1259–60 (2001). 
46
  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666 (emphasis 
added).  This conclusion is consistent with the prior opinion expressed by the Register of Copyrights a 
decade earlier.  Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the Comm. on the Judi-
ciary on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835, Part 3, 89th Cong. 1861 (1966) (statement of Bel-
la Linden) (stating ―I do not believe that the transitory image of a copyrighted work, taken from an 
authorized reproduction stored in a computer and consulted at the computer site, should be treated as 
different from the consultation of a book in a library‖). 
47
  Two post-Peak legislative changes could suggest that Congress embraced its RAM copy doctrine.  
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) revised the existing § 117 exception, sanctioning com-
puter maintenance and repair to the extent those activities result in the creation of copies of programs.  
17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (2006).  This provision, while rebuking Peak, assumes that courts could consider in-
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Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit‘s willingness to rely on the CONTU report‘s 
nonauthoritative interpretation of existing law while ignoring the words of 
Congress does little to bolster confidence in Peak‘s analysis.  
With respect to precedent, the court acknowledged that it could find no 
cases specifically holding that RAM instantiations are copies.48  But it 
forged ahead with the limited precedent it could muster, citing only two 
cases, neither of which directly addressed the RAM copy question.  The 
first of these cases, Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., only addressed cop-
ies created in memory tangentially49 and suffers from the same ambiguity 
found in the CONTU report, potentially not referring to RAM at all.50 
The Peak court also relied on Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int‟l 
Inc.51  Unlike Vault, Apple embraced a clear distinction between RAM and 
more permanent varieties of memory.  The Apple court considered whether 
Formula infringed Apple‘s copyright by reproducing its software in ROM 
chipsets.52  Formula argued that its reproduction was protected under Sec-
tion 117 of the Copyright Act, which permits copies created as an essential 
step in using a computer program.53  The court rejected this defense on the 
grounds that ROM copies were unnecessary since the software could be 
represented in RAM.  The court described RAM instantiations as ―tempo-
                                                                                                                           
stantiations in RAM to be copies.  Likewise, the DMCA added a new § 512 creating a number of safe 
harbors for providers who transmit, store, and locate information over digital networks.  Congress 
enacted the transmission safe harbor in § 512(a) because ―in the course of moving packets of informa-
tion across digital online networks, many intermediate and transient copies of the information may be 
made in routers and servers along the way.‖  S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 41 (1998).  Again, unless these in-
stantiations could be treated as copies, this limitation on liability would be unnecessary. 
Congress‘s sensitivity to potential liability could suggest an underlying endorsement of Peak.  See 
Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the “Digital Millennium”, 23 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 137, 
141 n.14 (1999) (suggesting that § 117(c) confirms Peak‘s RAM holding).  Such an argument overstates 
Congress‘s response.  Congress enacted two narrow limitations intended to target specific consequences 
of the RAM copy doctrine.  But Congress never signaled agreement with that doctrine, only recognition 
of its common law development.  The legislative history carefully avoids any endorsement of Peak.  See 
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 56–57 (referring to § 117(c) as ―a minor, yet important clarifica-
tion . . . necessary in light of judicial decisions‖); id. at 19 (noting that ―Section 512 is not intended to 
imply that a service provider is or is not liable as an infringer either for conduct that qualifies for a limi-
tation of liability or for conduct that fails to so qualify‖); see also Jonathan Band & Jeny Marcinko, A 
New Perspective on Temporary Copies: The Fourth Circuit‟s Opinion in Costar v. Loopnet, 2005 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. P1, ¶ 18 (noting that Congress declined to ―endorse[] the decisions that determined a 
RAM copy was a copy for copyright purposes‖ but ―simply acknowledged that the courts had so 
found‖). 
48
  Peak, 991 F.2d at 519. 
49
  847 F.2d 255, 261 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Nicholson, supra note 10, at 149 (discussing the vola-
tile nature of information stored in RAM). 
50
  Elkin-Koren, supra note 44, at 354. 
51
  Peak, 991 F.2d at 518 (citing Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int‘l, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617, 621 
(C.D. Cal. 1984)). 
52
  ROM, or read only memory, is a nonvolatile form of memory that stores data permanently or 
semi-permanently even if power is lost.  MUELLER, supra note 10, at 424.  
53
  See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2006). 
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rary fixation[s]‖ because once the ―computer is turned off, the copy of the 
programs recorded in RAM is lost.‖54 
The Peak court insisted that Apple‘s use of the terms ―copy‖ and ―fixa-
tion‖ to describe RAM instantiations supported its holding.55  But the Apple 
court‘s choice of terminology is at best ambiguous.  Apple appears to have 
used ―copy‖ and ―fixation‖ in their nontechnical sense, as opposed to the 
strict definitions of the Copyright Act.  What is clear is that the Apple court 
deemed RAM instantiations temporary in comparison to fixed ROM cop-
ies.56  Rather than bolstering the Peak court‘s reading, this conclusion un-
dercuts it. 
The doctrinal foundation for Peak‘s conclusion that all RAM instantia-
tions are copies consists of two nested statutory definitions, two judicial 
opinions, and one quasi-legislative report.57  Neither the nonauthoritative 
CONTU report nor the Vault opinion unambiguously refers to RAM instan-
tiations at all.  Moreover, Peak misinterpreted both the Apple decision and 
the text of the Copyright Act.  Given this tottering foundation, the hard 
RAM copy doctrine Peak conceived, even if not entirely indefensible, is far 
from unassailable. 
 
2. Peak‟s Policy Consequences.—Peak is equally vulnerable to poli-
cy-based critiques.  A long line of scholars has ably described the troubling 
implications of a rule that extends control over the creation of temporary 
digital instantiations to copyright holders.  If Peak accurately reflects the 
law, every use of a digital work necessarily implicates the exclusive rights 
of the copyright holder, affording new power over reading, viewing, or oth-
erwise using lawfully acquired works.58  This expansion of the reach of the 
copyright grant marks a significant departure from its traditional scope.  
 
 
 
54
  Apple Computer, Inc., 594 F. Supp. at 622. 
55
  Peak, 991 F.2d at 518–19 (citing Apple Computer, Inc., 594 F. Supp. at 621). 
56
  See also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 n.3 (3d Cir. 
1983) (explaining that ―RAM . . . is a chip on which volatile internal memory is stored which is erased 
when the computer‘s power is turned off‖ in contrast to ―permanent memory devices‖). 
57
  The court also relied on a leading treatise authored by a commissioner of CONTU.  See Peak, 991 
F.2d at 519 (citing MELVILLE B. NIMMER, 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.08 at 8-105 (1983)).  However, 
the proposition for which the court relied on Nimmer—that ―inputting a computer program entails the 
preparation of a copy‖—does not refer on its face to RAM instantiations and, like the CONTU report 
and Vault, may embrace only more permanent forms of memory.  See id. 
58
  See Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 31–32 
(1994).  Of course, even if a RAM copy establishes a prima facie violation of a copyright holder‘s ex-
clusive rights, infringement is not a foregone conclusion.  Defenses including fair use and implied li-
cense would, in some cases, protect readers from liability.  See Mark Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping 
Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 547, 567 (1997) (suggesting that implied license 
provides a defense, but it does so ―precisely . . . where . . . least needed‖); Jule L. Sigall, Comment, 
Copyright Infringement Was Never This Easy: RAM Copies and Their Impact on the Scope of Copyright 
Protection for Computer Programs, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 181, 217–19 (1995) (arguing that RAM copies 
104:1067  (2010) Fixing RAM Copies 
 1079 
Moreover, judicial expansion of the scope of the reproduction right 
makes a hash of the statutory scheme crafted by Congress, one characte-
rized by enumerated and distinct exclusive rights.59  To the extent copyright 
law has regulated use historically, it has done so through its display and 
performance rights.  In the digital realm, the RAM copy doctrine supplants 
these rights by rendering every instantiation of a work a copy.60  Aside from 
diluting the coherence of the statutory system, the RAM copy doctrine razes 
a crucial distinction between private and public uses.61  While the display 
and performance rights granted by the Copyright Act extend only to public 
use,62 the RAM copy doctrine permits the reproduction right to regulate pri-
vate use as well. 
The overlap of exclusive rights triggered by RAM copies creates 
another set of concerns.  Overlapping rights undermine existing license ar-
rangements.63  Consider an exhibitor licensed to publicly perform a motion 
picture.  Regardless of that license, the use of digital projection to exhibit 
the film could still result in a violation of the reproduction right since the 
performance entails creation of RAM instantiations.64 
Consumers too feel the effect of the expansion of the reproduction 
right into territory previously occupied solely by other exclusive rights.  
The first sale doctrine, for example, permits the lawful owner of a copy of a 
work to dispose of that copy as she sees fit without risking a violation of the 
distribution right.65  But while you may be free to give your dog-eared pa-
perback to a friend, sharing an eBook is a riskier proposition.  Even if the 
distribution of an eBook is permitted by the first sale doctrine, reading the 
document, under Peak, entails the creation of one or more RAM copies, re-
productions beyond the limited protection of first sale.  
Each of these critiques demonstrates that Peak disturbs settled expecta-
tions about the purpose and operation of copyright law.  Nonetheless, 
Peak‘s RAM copy doctrine remains the prevailing approach among courts.  
But as the next Part details, the Second Circuit has recently undertaken an 
                                                                                                                           
should be considered fair uses).  The degree of insulation these defenses offer in practice remains far 
from certain. 
59
  See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (listing the exclusive rights of copyright holders). 
60
  See R. Anthony Reese, The Public Display Right: The Copyright Act‟s Neglected Solution to the 
Controversy Over RAM “Copies”, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 141. 
61
  See id. at 143–45.  
62
  See 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
63
  See Lemley, supra note 58, at 568.  
64
  Similarly, overlapping rights create unanticipated difficulties in litigation.  Because copyright in-
terests are divisible, the display and reproduction rights in a particular work, for example, might be con-
trolled by two different parties.  An accused infringer who digitally displays a work, creating an 
incidental RAM instantiation in the process, could face two separate lawsuits filed by the respective 
rights holders for a single act of infringement.  
65
  17 U.S.C. § 109; see Lemley, supra note 58, at 575–76; Liu, supra note 45, at 1249–50. 
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independent analysis of the status of temporary instantiations that led to 
very different results. 
II. REVISITING RAM INSTANTIATIONS 
Although Peak continues to represent the dominant approach, the 
Second Circuit‘s decision in Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings suggests 
that courts remain willing to consider claims of infringement based on tem-
porary instantiations with sensitivity to the unique facts of particular cases.  
This Part begins by examining the Cartoon Network decision and its depar-
ture from the rigid mode of analysis defined by Peak.  In many respects, 
Cartoon Network represents a notable progression in the judicial treatment 
of temporary instantiations.  But Cartoon Network leaves a number of key 
questions unanswered and gives rise to its own set of problems. 
A. Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings 
In the past decade, the digital video recorder (DVR) has taken its 
rightful place next to the microwave oven in the pantheon of essential 
household electronics.66  DVRs record television programming to hard 
disks, enabling time-shifted viewing and allowing users to pause and re-
wind live broadcasts.67  Companies like Tivo market standalone set-top 
DVRs to consumers, while cable and satellite providers offer similar boxes 
that integrate with their services.68 
Cablevision, a major cable television provider, has offered traditional 
set-top DVRs to its customers since 2004.69  In 2006, it announced a plan to 
introduce a new DVR offering to its customers, the Remote Storage DVR 
(RS-DVR).  From the perspective of the end user, the RS-DVR is virtually 
indistinguishable from its more traditional counterpart.  RS-DVR users 
 
 
 
66
  See Press Release, NDS Group Ltd., 7 Out of 10 People Who Own a DVR Say They Can‘t Live 
Without It According to NDS Survey, http://nds.com/press_releases/NDS_DVR_Survey_030908.html 
(last visited Aug. 9, 2010) (noting that DVR owners ranked the device as the third most indispensable 
item after the washing machine and microwave oven). 
67
  In many respects the DVR represents a linear technological progression from an earlier innova-
tion in home recording, the videocassette recorder, or VCR.  In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the manufacturer of early video recorder technology could not 
be held contributorily liable for infringement committed by the users of that technology because it was 
capable of substantial noninfringing use.  464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).  Despite the Sony safe harbor, early 
DVR developers faced similar allegations of indirect infringement.  See Complaint, Paramount Pictures 
Corp. v. ReplayTV, Civ. No. 01-09358 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2001), 2001 WL 35823747, available at 
http://w2.eff.org/IP/Video/Paramount_v_ReplayTV/20011031_complaint.html.  The legal costs asso-
ciated with this suit contributed to the eventual bankruptcy of SonicBlue, the company behind the pio-
neering DVR ReplayTV.  See Mary Hodder, SonicBlue Declares Bankruptcy: Another Point for the 
Incumbents,  BIPLOG (Mar. 21, 2003, 4:54 PM), http://journalism.berkeley.edu/projects/biplog/archive/ 
000751.html . 
68
  Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 611 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff‟d sub nom. Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
69
  Id. at 612. 
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schedule recordings and initiate playback through onscreen menus con-
trolled via remote control, and they can record the same lineup of programs 
available to set-top DVR users.70 
But the design of the RS-DVR differs from older set-top models in 
some important respects.  Whereas traditional DVRs store recorded pro-
gramming on hard disks located within the set-top box itself, the RS-DVR 
stores recordings on dedicated hard disk space in computer servers centrally 
located in Cablevision facilities.  When a user plays back a show on a RS-
DVR, the recording is transmitted from Cablevision‘s servers to the user‘s 
television.71  This networked design offers Cablevision a number of bene-
fits, including reduced hardware, installation, and maintenance costs.72 
Apprised of Cablevision‘s plans, a collection of television networks 
and movie studios, including Cartoon Network, filed suit against Cablevi-
sion and its operating company, CSC Holdings (collectively ―CSC‖).73  
Plaintiffs alleged CSC would directly infringe its rights of reproduction and 
public performance by offering the RS-DVR.74  These claims were based on 
a number of alleged acts of infringement, only some of which bear on the 
RAM copy controversy.75 
A brief discussion of the relevant technical details will help place these 
allegations in context.  Again, while Cablevision customers control the RS-
DVR from the comfort of their sofas, the back end of the system is located 
in Cablevision‘s own facilities.  The operation of the RS-DVR system be-
gins when a data stream containing all of the television programming of-
fered by Cablevision enters a device called the Broadband Multimedia 
Router (BMR).  The BMR divides that single data stream into separate 
streams for each television channel.76  This conversion requires the BMR to 
 
 
 
70
  Id.  
71
  Id. at 615. 
72
  However, the efficiencies of the RS-DVR were limited to some extent by legal worries.  Rather 
than storing a single copy of recorded programs that could be transmitted to each user, Cablevision 
chose to store a separate copy of each program for each subscriber who chose to record it.  Id.  Presuma-
bly this more resource intensive design decision was made to minimize potential liability for publicly 
performing the programs in question.  For further discussion of the relationship between copyright law 
and technological efficiency, see Ed Felten, Cablevision and Anti-Efficiency Policy, FREEDOM TO 
TINKER (Apr. 18, 2007, 5:24 AM), http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/cablevision-and-anti-
efficiency-policy. 
73
  Twentieth Century Fox, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 609–10. 
74
  Claims for contributory and vicarious liability were conspicuously absent from the complaint.  As 
a strategic matter, the plaintiffs agreed to forego any claims premised on indirect infringement in ex-
change for Cablevision‘s agreement not to raise a fair use defense to the direct infringement claims.  Id. 
at 616. 
75
  The plaintiffs also alleged that their rights were infringed by the creation of copies of program-
ming on Cablevision‘s centrally located hard disk and the display of recorded programs to Cablevision 
subscribers.  The district court agreed that these acts constituted infringement despite Cablevision‘s ar-
gument that its customers initiate both recording and playback.  Id. at 624. 
76
  The BMR also altered the bitrate of the incoming data stream and assigned port numbers to each 
individual data stream to identify the channel it contained.  Id. at 613. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1082 
load the data stream into its buffer memory, a form of RAM,77 for no more 
than 1.2 seconds.78   
The BMR then relays these data streams to one of many servers con-
taining hard drives on which recorded programs are stored.79  The server 
buffers these streams in its primary ingest buffer, which retains no more 
than three frames—or one tenth of a second—of video for each channel at 
any one time.80  These streams are buffered by the primary ingest buffer au-
tomatically, regardless of whether a customer requests a recording of any 
particular program.81 
If a customer initiates a recording, the server moves data for the se-
lected channel from the primary ingest buffer to its secondary ingest buf-
fer.82  From the secondary ingest buffer, data is written to the server‘s hard 
drive, where the program is stored for later viewing.  When a customer 
chooses to view that recording, the copy on the hard drive passes through a 
streaming buffer that contains as much as two seconds of video.83  In total, 
recording and play back of a single television recording requires the crea-
tion of at least four buffer instantiations. 
Cartoon Network argued that each of these buffer instantiations is a 
copy that violates its reproduction right.  CSC maintained that data passing 
through the buffer memory of the BMR and its servers are not fixed and 
thus not copies.  After reciting the appropriate definitions from the Copy-
right Act, the district court, relying on the Peak line of cases84 and the Cop-
 
 
 
77
  Id. at 614. 
78
  Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121, at 124–25 (2d Cir. 2008). 
79
  Twentieth Century Fox, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 614.  
80
  Id. 
81
  Id. 
82
  Id. at 615. 
83
  Id. at 615–16.  
84
  The district court, in keeping with the bulk of the case law, adopted the hard variant of Peak‘s 
RAM copy doctrine.  Id. at 621 (noting that ―numerous courts have held that the transmission of infor-
mation through a computer‘s random access memory . . . creates a ‗copy‘‖). 
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yright Office‘s Section 104 Report,85 concluded that buffer instantiations are 
copies because they can be reproduced on hard disk in a permanent form.86 
Like the sources upon which it relied, the district court ignored the sta-
tutory requirement that a fixation persist for a period of more than transitory 
duration.  Moreover, as the court‘s own description of the RS-DVR estab-
lishes, only the secondary ingest buffer is capable of being copied to the 
server hard disk drives.  Nonetheless, the court offered the ability to create a 
downstream reproduction as the sole justification for classifying all four 
buffers as copies.  But the district court‘s analysis, even if flawed, is simply 
a workaday application of the rigid analytical approach developed by Peak 
and its progeny.  
On appeal, the Second Circuit showed considerably less deference to 
the orthodox RAM copy analysis.  Rather than simply reciting the defini-
tions of ―copies‖ and ―fixed‖ before embarking on a rote application of the 
RAM copy doctrine, the court noted that together those definitions impose 
two distinct requirements any putative copy must satisfy.87  First, the al-
leged copy must be sufficiently embodied to be perceived, reproduced, and 
communicated.88  Second, that embodiment must persist for more than a 
transitory duration.89  According to the Second Circuit, the district court 
erred by focusing on embodiment to the exclusion of the durational re-
quirement. 
This blunt assessment of the shortcomings of the opinion below con-
trasts sharply with the court‘s charitable reading of Peak.90  The Second 
Circuit took great pains to rhetorically minimize its departure from the 
Ninth Circuit‘s approach to temporary instantiations.  The Cartoon Network 
 
 
 
85
  The Copyright Office‘s Section 104 Report, while offering a considerably more detailed analysis, 
largely reiterates the central holding of Peak.  According to the Copyright Office, if an instantiation of a 
work persists long enough to be copied, perceived, or communicated, it is fixed.  COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 110–12 (2001) [hereinafter 104 REPORT].  This reading, however, col-
lapses the two requirements of fixation imposed by the Copyright Act, essentially eliminating any inde-
pendent role for the statute‘s ―transitory duration‖ language.  See id. 
The 104 Report suggests that a transitory duration is necessarily less than an ephemeral one since the 
Copyright Act provides an exemption to liability for the creation of ephemeral copies by certain broad-
casting organizations.  See 17 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); 104 REPORT at 111.  The Copyright Office‘s asser-
tion is correct as far as it goes.  But the term ―ephemeral,‖ as defined by the Copyright Act, bears little 
connection to its common English usage.  Such ephemeral copies created under § 112 can persist for as 
long as six months, 17 U.S.C. § 112(a)(1)(C), one year, id. § 112(c)(3), or seven years, id. § 112(b)(2).  
Section 112 simply offers no valuable insight into the proper understanding of transitory duration. 
86
  Twentieth Century Fox, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 621–22. 
87
  Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2008). 
88
  Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101). 
89
  Id. 
90
  The Second Circuit also openly criticized the Section 104 Report for reading the durational re-
quirement out of the statute.  Id. at 129.  The court deemed the report‘s conclusion that an instantiation 
in RAM is a copy unless it ―manifests itself so fleetingly that it cannot be copied, perceived or commu-
nicated‖ unpersuasive.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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court explained away Peak‘s failure to address the durational requirement 
by presuming that the RAM instantiations at issue in Peak lasted ―for at 
least several minutes.‖91  According to the Second Circuit, Peak did not read 
the durational requirement out of the statute, but implicitly found that it had 
been satisfied.  But Peak contains no factual findings concerning the dura-
tion of the RAM instantiations, nor does it hint at any conclusions drawn on 
the basis of such facts.  Instead it offers a holding that is entirely devoid of 
references to duration.  Nonetheless, the Second Circuit conspicuously re-
jected the notion that Peak stands for an inflexible RAM copy doctrine deaf 
to the durational requirement.  Peak, the Second Circuit maintained, did not 
hold that all RAM instantiations are necessarily copies, only that they may 
be copies if that classification is borne out by the facts.  Any other reading, 
the court suggested, would accuse the Ninth Circuit of ignoring the text of 
the Copyright Act.92  
The Second Circuit‘s effort to reconcile its fact-based inquiry with 
Peak‘s perfunctory rule, even if transparent, is understandable.  Rather than 
announce an inter-circuit dispute that situates Peak at center stage and po-
tentially lessens Cartoon Network‘s precedential impact, the Second Circuit 
ushered Peak into the wings, leaving the Cartoon Network reasoning to 
stand on its own merit.  But the Second Circuit‘s careful positioning cannot 
mask the lingering circuit split its rejection of Peak creates.93 
After endeavoring to minimize its departure from Peak, the Second 
Circuit offered a straightforward analysis of the RS-DVR buffers.  Because 
the embodiment prong was not genuinely disputed, the question turned on 
whether the buffer instantiations were transitory.  Importantly, the court li-
mited the scope of its inquiry to the primary ingest and BMR buffers, both 
of which contained data regardless of user requests.94  The court noted that 
 
 
 
91
  Id. at 128. 
92
  Id.   
93
  Although the Supreme Court ultimately declined to grant the copyright holders‘ petition for certi-
orari, it invited the Solicitor General to weigh in on the RAM instantiation controversy.  See CNN, Inc. 
v. CSC Holdings, 129 S. Ct. 985, 985–86 (U.S. 2009).  The Solicitor General, much like the Second 
Circuit, attempted to minimize the gulf between the Peak line of cases and Cartoon Network.  According 
to the Solicitor General, the Second Circuit merely ―distinguished, rather than disagreed with‖ Peak.  
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, CNN, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, 129 S. Ct. 985 (U.S. 
2009) [hereinafter CSC Brief].  Under this reading, Peak simply neglected to address the transitory dura-
tion requirement rather than affirmatively reading it out of the statute.  Id.  Again, this charitable reading 
of Peak is inconsistent with the sweeping statements of its holding in both subsequent cases and Peak 
itself.  
Another rationale offered by the Solicitor General for not granting certiorari is more persuasive.  Be-
cause the parties agreed to take questions of indirect liability and fair use off of the table, Cartoon Net-
work offered the Court an inopportune record to fully address the issues raised by the RS-DVR 
technology.  See id. at 11–14.  But this argument is unrelated to the claim that Cartoon Network and 
Peak are reconcilable. 
94
  CSC argued that copies resulting from subscriber commands to record and play back content 
were made, if at all, by the subscriber rather than Cablevision.  This argument extended to the secondary 
ingest and streaming buffers, prompting the court to focus its analysis on the buffers CSC admittedly 
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data in these buffers persists for only 0.1 to 1.2 seconds and are automati-
cally overwritten.95  Stressing the fact-specific nature of inquiry, the court 
was satisfied that the RS-DVR buffers contained unfixed transitory instan-
tiations, not copies.96 
B. Evaluating Cartoon Network 
Despite its claims to the contrary, Cartoon Network signals a major 
shift away from the prevailing judicial treatment of temporary digital in-
stantiations.  Rejecting the hard RAM copy doctrine and its manifest mi-
sreading of the statute, Cartoon Network clears the initial hurdle of lending 
independent meaning to each element of fixation.  Further, Cartoon Net-
work displays a degree of sensitivity to the wide range of facts that give rise 
to RAM instantiations, recognizing that a rule that paints all alleged copies 
with the same broad brush likely oversimplifies the inquiry. 
These virtues aside, Cartoon Network is wanting in some important re-
spects.  Although the Second Circuit underscored the necessity of satisfying 
the durational requirement, it teaches precious little about the substantive 
obligations imposed by that requirement.  The court offers no test for transi-
tory duration, and provides no transparent set of criteria for its evaluation of 
the RS-DVR buffers.  The court‘s holding has intuitive appeal, but the rea-
soning that produced it remains shrouded in something of a black box. 
Because the court‘s logic is not revealed on the face of its opinion, 
fundamental questions about the nature of its analysis remain unanswered.  
On one reading, the Cartoon Network approach to RAM instantiations may 
be reducible to a matter of pure durational line drawing.  The court repeat-
edly stresses the brief existence of these would-be copies.97  But if temporal 
considerations alone drive the court‘s analysis, Cartoon Network does little 
to help future courts, developers, or copyright holders locate the durational 
threshold.98  Rather than identifying the location of the line separating fixed 
copies from unfixed instantiations, the Second Circuit simply announced 
                                                                                                                           
created.  With respect to the secondary ingest buffer, the court held that any copies created in response 
to requests to record a program were created by subscribers.  Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 132.  The 
performance of recorded programs, presumably encompassing the streaming buffer, were according to 
the court private rather than public, and thus beyond the scope of the copyrights holders‘ exclusive 
rights.  Id. at 138. 
95
  Id. at 124–25. 
96
  Id. at 130. 
97
  At least one court has relied on Cartoon Network‘s ―suggest[ion] that the duration requirement 
would be satisfied where the program remained in the RAM for at least several minutes‖ to support a 
finding of infringement.  SimplexGrinnell LP v. Integrated Sys. & Power, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 167, 189 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (internal citations omitted) (finding a copy was created when software was loaded into 
RAM for ―several minutes to several hours‖). 
98
  See Eric Goldman, “DVR as a Service” Isn‟t Copyright Infringement—Cartoon Network v. CSC 
Holdings, TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW BLOG (Aug. 4, 2008), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/ 
archives/2008/08/dvr_as_a_servic.htm (noting that Cartoon Network ―deftly side-steps‖ the difficulty of 
identifying any particular durational threshold). 
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that the RS-DVR buffers are safely to one side of it.  Without some dura-
tional metric, the outcomes of litigation will be the only reliable indications 
of the status of RAM instantiations. 
But if the court‘s description of the RS-DVR buffers is any indication, 
its rationale is not one rooted entirely in temporal considerations.  The 
court, shortly before concluding that the buffers did not result in copies, 
noted that their data was ―rapidly and automatically overwritten as soon as 
it [wa]s processed.‖99  Although this fact relates to the duration of buffer da-
ta, the court‘s recitation suggests a concern that goes beyond the quantita-
tive inquiry to touch on the ways in which the system processes and uses 
data.  Both parties stressed the role of qualitative factors parties in their 
briefing, so the court‘s sensitivity to the issue is not entirely surprising.100  If 
the court did take these factors into account, precisely which qualitative 
considerations it thought relevant remains unclear.  Equally unexplained is 
the relationship between quantitative and qualitative factors.  Cartoon Net-
work offers no insight as to their interplay or relative weight. 
Because the court‘s logic is largely obscured, Cartoon Network intro-
duces a significant degree of uncertainty to future disputes over temporary 
instantiations.  For all its faults, the hard RAM copy doctrine that emerged 
from Peak and its progeny offered a high degree of predictability.  All in-
stantiations of copyrighted works in the memory of computing devices were 
copies.  Even if incorrect as a matter of law and unjustifiable as a matter of 
policy, the Peak rule led to reasonably settled expectations about the legal 
risk to developers of digital technologies.  This bright-line rule also greatly 
simplified the court‘s task in evaluating claims of infringement.  
Cartoon Network sacrifices this clarity in exchange for what the 
Second Circuit reasonably deems an outcome more consistent with the text 
and purpose of the Copyright Act.  As the court admits, the inquiry required 
by Cartoon Network is necessarily a fact-specific one that must proceed on 
a case-by-case basis.101  To the extent future courts follow the Second Cir-
cuit‘s lead, the common law process will define the contours of the transito-
ry duration requirement with greater clarity.  But as the initial marker along 
 
 
 
99
  Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130. 
100
  CSC maintained that buffer data existed only while in transit between system components, and 
were thus literally transitory.  Brief and Special Appendix for Defendants-Counterclaimants-Appellants 
at 40, Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. May 30, 2007) (Nos. 07-1480-cv(L), 
07-1511-cv(CON)), 2007 WL 6101602.  Plaintiffs, on the other hand, urged the court to consider the 
functional role of buffer copies in enabling permanent downstream copies.  Because buffer instantiations 
were capable of being reproduced in fixed hard disk copies, they argued buffer data should be treated as 
fixed.  See Brief of Plaintiffs-Counterclaim-Defendants-Appellees the Cartoon Network at 49–50, Car-
toon Network v. CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. June 20, 2007) (Nos. 07-1480-cv(L), 07-1511-
cv(CON)), 2007 WL 6101601.  As a matter of statutory interpretation, the notion that the phrase ―for 
more than a transitory duration‖ modifies potential downstream copies rather than the instantiation in 
question is implausible.  
101
  See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130 (noting that cases turn on the specific conduct at issue).   
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that path, Cartoon Network offers limited guidance in locating the elusive 
line between fixed copies and fleeting ephemera.102 
This uncertainty is exacerbated by the narrow facts before the court.  
The buffers it considered persisted for only 0.1 to 1.2 seconds and were ra-
pidly and automatically overwritten by incoming data.103  Even within these 
narrow confines, the Second Circuit left open the possibility that ―other fac-
tors not present here may alter the duration analysis significantly.‖104  This 
cryptic proviso further limits the counsel that Cartoon Network offers future 
courts. 
Given these open questions, Cartoon Network cannot claim to have 
fully resolved the controversy over RAM instantiations.  Nonetheless, by 
rejecting a dominant but flawed statutory reading, Cartoon Network 
represents the first tentative steps towards a solution to the RAM copy 
problem.  For too long, a well-rehearsed debate has centered on Peak.  
Courts have blindly followed it, and scholars have doggedly attacked it.  
But before Cartoon Network, few had offered alternative methodologies.  
Despite its imperfections, Cartoon Network frees courts from the rigid Peak 
doctrine and suggests the possibility of a new way forward.  The next Part 
builds on the Second Circuit‘s insights to outline a complete framework for 
the analysis of temporary instantiations. 
III. DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR RAM INSTANTIATIONS 
Peak provides consistent and predictable outcomes in RAM copy cas-
es, but rests on an unjustifiable reading of the statute.  Cartoon Network of-
fers a more nuanced and more accurate statutory interpretation, but 
threatens unpredictability in future cases.  An ideal framework for analyz-
ing temporary instantiations would combine the subtlety of Cartoon Net-
work with the predictability of Peak.  But these two values are in tension.  
Peak‘s predictability, after all, stems from its sweepingly over-inclusive 
understanding of RAM copies.  This Part attempts to construct an approach 
that is mindful of the best features of Peak and Cartoon Network by identi-
fying concrete factors that courts should consider in distinguishing fixed 
copies from mere instantiations. 
 
 
 
102
  As a result, the few courts that have decided RAM copying questions in the wake of Cartoon 
Network have failed to embrace its fundamental lesson.  In SimplexGrinnell LP v. Integrated Sys. & 
Power, Inc., the court bypassed any genuine analysis of the RAM copy question by limiting Cartoon 
Network to exceptionally brief instantiations and concluding that those lasting for ―several minutes to 
several hours‖ were necessarily fixed.  642 F. Supp. 2d at 189. 
In another recent case, the Fourth Circuit upheld a jury verdict against a defendant for creating RAM 
copies when its employees powered on computers containing the plaintiff‘s software, the license for 
which had expired.  Quantum Sys. Integrators, Inc. v. Sprint Nextel Corp, Nos. 08-1534–45, 2009 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 14766, at *18–19 (4th Cir. July 7, 2009).  The court cited Cartoon Network in passing, but 
relied on Peak for the proposition that RAM instantiations are fixed copies.  Id. 
103
  See supra text accompanying note 95. 
104
  Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130. 
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Specifically, this Part begins by exploring the relevance of the statutory 
definitions of ―copies‖ and ―fixed,‖ the shared starting points in both Peak 
and Cartoon Network.  Some have argued that these definitions, which were 
crafted to clarify the scope of the subject matter protected by copyright, are 
irrelevant to questions of infringement.  But this Part suggests that, despite 
the focus of the drafters of the Copyright Act, those definitions play a cen-
tral role in the analysis of infringement in cases dealing with temporary in-
stantiations. 
Next, this Part explores the meaning of those definitions.  In particular, 
it aims to give some content to a central requirement of fixation—that an 
instantiation persist for more than a transitory duration.  Three sets of con-
siderations shed light on the scope of transitory duration: its application in 
the copyrightability context; qualitative dimensions that take into account 
the function of temporary instantiations; and the traditional roles of the re-
production right.  Based on these considerations, this Part develops a set of 
factors on which courts can rely to identify fixed copies. 
 
A. The Relevance of Statutory Definitions 
The terms ―copies‖ and ―fixed‖ play two roles in copyright law.105  
First, they figure in determining whether a work is eligible for protection.  
Second, as Peak and Cartoon Network demonstrate, they help courts deter-
mine whether the reproduction right has been infringed.106  Although the 
Copyright Act defines these terms generally, Congress crafted their defini-
tions with copyrightability concerns at the fore.  As a result, a ―copy‖ as de-
fined by the Act for protectability purposes might be quite distinct from the 
concept of a ―copy‖ in the infringement context.  If so, courts considering 
RAM instantiations are mistaken in their shared reliance on the statutory 
definitions as the starting point for their inquiry. 
The term ―copy‖ helps delineate copyrightable subject matter by draw-
ing a conceptual distinction between tangible embodiments of a work and 
the work itself.  A copy is a ―material object[] . . . in which a work is 
fixed . . . and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated.‖107  Copies include not only reproductions of a work, 
 
 
 
105
  See Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ‘g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that 
―the sole purpose of § 101‘s definitions of the words ‗copies‘ and ‗fixed‘ is . . . to define the material 
objects in which copyrightable and infringing works may be embedded and to describe the requisite 
fixed nature of that work within the material object‖). 
106
  The terms also figure in analysis of infringement of the distribution right.  17 U.S.C. § 106(3) 
(2006); see infra Part III.B.   
107
  17 U.S.C. § 101.  Similarly, the Act defines ―phonorecords‖ as ―material objects in which 
sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any me-
thod now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.‖  Id. 
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but also ―the material object . . . in which the work is first fixed.‖108  For the 
purposes of the Copyright Act, an original manuscript of a work is just as 
much a copy as any downstream duplicate.  These copies are distinct from 
the intangible intellectual creation of the author, or the ―work‖ in the par-
lance of the Copyright Act.109  Previous acts did not define ―copies,‖110 but 
the 1976 Act took pains to distinguish between a copyrighted work and its 
physical embodiment. 
The Register of Copyrights111 first voiced the need for a statutory defi-
nition of ―copies‖ in 1965.  According to the Register, the failure to distin-
guish between works of authorship and the material objects embodying 
them ―resulted in a great deal of unnecessary confusion‖ and ―unpredictable 
or unfair‖ results in individual cases.112  Congress agreed that this definition 
―reflect[ed] a fundamental distinction between the ‗original work‘ which is 
the product of ‗authorship‘ and the multitude of material objects in which it 
can be embodied.‖113  Congress saw the definition of ―copies‖ as central to 
the question of copyrightability, explaining ―two essential elements—
original work and tangible object—must merge through fixation in order to 
produce subject matter copyrightable under the statute.‖114 
Fixation plays a different and more fundamental role in the copyrigh-
tability context.  In order to be protected by copyright, a work must be 
―fixed in any tangible medium of expression.‖115  The origins of this re-
quirement are constitutional.  Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitu-
tion empowers Congress to grant authors exclusive rights in their 
―Writings.‖116  This limitation accommodates a wide range of media, but 
precludes protection for works not recorded in some enduring form.117  In 
 
 
 
108
  Id.  
109
  The Copyright Act enumerates categories of works of authorship eligible for protection, among 
them literary, dramatic, and musical works, motion pictures, and sound recordings.  See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 102.  
110
  See, e.g., Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (current versions at 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 101–02). 
111
  The Register of Copyrights is the ―director of the Copyright Office of the Library of Congress‖ 
and is charged with ―advis[ing] Congress on national and international issues relating to copyright.‖  17 
U.S.C. § 701. 
112
  STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE 
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION 
BILL 4 (Comm. Print 1965). 
113
  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 52 (1975).  Congress used these 
same terms a decade earlier to describe the identical definition of copies introduced in 1965.  See H.R. 
REP. NO. 89-2237, at 45 (1966). 
114
  See H.R. REP. NO. 89-2237, at 45. 
115
  17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
116
  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
117
  See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (―[T]he word ‗writings‘ . . . may be inter-
preted to include any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.‖); Bur-
row-Giles Lithographic, Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1883) (embracing an understanding of ―Writ-
―Writings‖ that includes ―all forms of writing, printing, engraving, etching, &c., by which the ideas in 
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the context of copyrightability, fixation ensures compliance with this con-
stitutional mandate. 
―Fixed‖ was likewise defined in the 1976 Act with an eye to copyrigh-
tability concerns.  Earlier revision bills left ―fixed‖ undefined, relying on 
the common law understanding of fixation.118  But with the enumeration of 
audiovisual works as copyrightable subject matter, Congress defined 
―fixed‖ in an effort to clarify the copyright status of live broadcasts.119  
Generally, a work is fixed ―when its embodiment in a copy . . . is sufficient-
ly permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.‖120  However, 
the statute goes on to stipulate that ―[a] work consisting of sounds, images, 
or both, that are being transmitted, is ‗fixed‘ . . . if a fixation of the work is 
being made simultaneously with its transmission.‖121  This exception to the 
general rule was intended to ensure that live programs, notably sporting 
events, are accorded copyright protection simultaneously with their broad-
cast, before a complete fixation exists.122 
Given this emphasis on copyrightability, one leading treatise author 
has criticized courts for relying on the definitions of ―fixed‖ and ―copies‖ to 
resolve the thorny issues presented by RAM instantiations.123  William Patry 
has argued that both Peak and Cartoon Network display an undue preoccu-
                                                                                                                           
the mind of the author are given visible expression‖); see also Aaron K. Perzanowski, The Penumbral 
Public Domain: Constitutional Limits on Quasi-Copyright Legislation, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1081, 
1119–20 (2008) (quoting same and indicating that writings only include works ―reduced to some tangi-
ble physical representation‖).   
118
  3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:63 (2007). 
119
  Id.  Patry also notes that Congress sought ―to exclude from protection evanescent images cap-
tured momentarily in the memory of a computer.‖  Id. 
120
  17 U.S.C. § 101. 
121
  Id. 
122
  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1976) (noting that the definition of ―fixation‖ was intended to re-
solve ―the status of live broadcasts—sports, news coverage, live performances of music, etc.—that are 
reaching the public in unfixed form but that are simultaneously being recorded‖).  The inclusion of this 
definition also prompted Congress to explain that ―purely evanescent or transient reproductions such as 
those projected briefly on a screen, shown electronically on a television or other cathode ray tube, or 
captured momentarily in the ‗memory‘ of a computer‖ were beyond the scope of fixation.  Id. at 53. 
The simultaneous transmission exception raises questions about the extent to which instantiations 
like those at issue in Cartoon Network satisfy the embodiment requirement of fixation.  The necessity of 
the exception suggests that the partial fixation of a work is normally insufficient to render the entire 
work fixed.  Like the fixation of a live transmission, the instantiations created in the buffers of the RS-
DVR system are only partial.  But unlike the fixation of a live transmission, the buffer never contains the 
entire work, only a series of partial instantiations.  In this sense, the partial serial instantiations in the 
RS-DVR buffer are even less fixed than the live transmissions Congress altered the Copyright Act to 
embrace. 
123
  See 3 PATRY, supra note 118, § 9.63; 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3.24 
(2007). 
104:1067  (2010) Fixing RAM Copies 
 1091 
pation with these statutory definitions.124  According to Patry, the two opi-
nions rely on a ―semantic sleight-of-hand‖ that equates a ―copy‖ in the sta-
tutorily defined copyrightability sense with an infringement of the 
reproduction right.125  Patry suggests courts should rely instead on the com-
mon law understanding of ―copies‖ that developed in the reproduction con-
text, an understanding that incorporates an inherent requirement of 
materiality, for reproduction purposes.126  As Patry notes, neither ―infringe-
ment‖ nor ―reproduction‖ is defined by the Copyright Act, suggesting that 
Congress did not intend to disturb common law standards for infringe-
ment.127 
The terms ―copies‖ and ―fixed‖ were not defined with the RAM copy 
controversy in mind.  Nonetheless, those definitions are likely to remain 
central to the resolution of disputes over RAM instantiations.  Although the 
Peak line of cases and Cartoon Network differ in fundamental respects, 
both accept these definitions as a common starting point.  More important-
ly, nothing in the text of the Copyright Acts indicates that the term ―copies‖ 
as used in connection with the reproduction right refers to anything other 
than that term‘s statutory definition.  The conspicuous presence of ―copies‖ 
within the reproduction right simply cannot be ignored. 
But the precise contribution of the definition of ―copies‖—and by ex-
tension ―fixed‖—to the infringement analysis requires a closer look at the 
varied ways in which copyright law talks about copies.  In the infringement 
context, copyright concerns itself with copies in three distinct ways.  First, 
copyright requires that an infringing work be a copy in the factual sense.  
The infringing expression must borrow from the protected work.  Indepen-
dently created works, no matter how similar, do not infringe.128  Second, the 
alleged infringement must be a copy in the legal sense.  In other words, the 
accused work must be substantially similar to the protected work.129  Factual 
and legal copying are necessary to establish infringement of any of the cop-
yright holder‘s exclusive rights.  But the reproduction right—the right ―to 
 
 
 
124
  See 3 PATRY, supra note 118, § 9.63.50 (agreeing with the outcome in Cartoon Network but 
suggesting ―a much simpler way to get to that result‖ that rejects the equation of ―copy‖ in the infringe-
ment analysis with that term‘s statutory definition).  1 PATRY, supra note 123, § 3.24.  
125
  3 PATRY, supra note 118, §§ 9.63, 9.63.5. 
126
  Id. 
127
  Id. § 9:63 (―Reproduction is not defined.‖); 1 PATRY, supra note 123, § 3.24 (―In the 1976 Act 
Congress declined to include a definition of infringement.‖).   
128
  See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (―[A] copyrighted directory is not infringed by a 
similar directory which is the product of independent work . . . .  Absent copying there can be no in-
fringement of copyright.‖ (footnotes omitted)). 
129
  See Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 268 (2d Cir. 2001) (―[N]ot all copying results in cop-
yright infringement, even if the plaintiff has a valid copyright.  Plaintiffs must also demonstrate ‗sub-
stantial similarity.‘‖ (citations omitted)); see also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01[B] (2009) (―[C]opying is ordinarily established indirectly by the plaintiff‘s 
proof of access and substantial similarity.‖ (internal citations and quotations omitted)). 
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reproduce the copyrighted work in copies‖130—contemplates copies in a 
third sense.  For an infringement to violate the reproduction right, rather 
than, for example, the public performance right, the infringing work needs 
to be embodied in some concrete form.  Showing a motion picture in public 
infringes if the performance is a copy in the factual and legal senses.  But 
because the performance does not result in a copy in the third sense, it is not 
an infringement of the reproduction right. 
These three conceptions of the copy shed some light on the charge that 
Peak and Cartoon Network conflate ―copies‖ as defined by the Copyright 
Act with copies for infringement purposes.  Patry posits that courts used a 
strict definitional understanding of ―copies‖ as a substitute for copying in 
the legal sense.131  But it appears more likely that Peak and Cartoon Net-
work relied on the statutory definitions to inform the third notion of copy-
ing, not the second.132  Since the RAM instantiation cases involved literal 
bit-for-bit copying, those courts were likely not concerned with substantial 
similarity.  Instead, the courts focused on whether these factual and legal 
copies could be deemed fixed copies in the sense required by the reproduc-
tion right. 
Although not dispositive, the definitions of ―fixed‖ and ―copies‖ are an 
inescapable component of infringement of the reproduction right.  In most 
cases, this element is not disputed.  But in cases alleging RAM copies, the 
question of whether the instantiations in question are ―fixed‖ and therefore 
―copies‖ in the sense defined by the statute is largely outcome determina-
tive.  The precise demands of those definitions, however, remain largely 
undefined.  The discussion below outlines their contours. 
B. The Contours of Transitory Duration 
The definitions of ―copies‖ and ―fixed‖ are central to the RAM copy 
question but remain poorly understood in at least one key respect.  The sta-
tus of temporary instantiations turns largely on the meaning of the phrase 
―transitory duration.‖133  Instantiations that persist for more than a transitory 
 
 
 
130
  17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006). 
131
  See 3 PATRY, supra note 118, § 9.63; 1 PATRY, supra note 123, § 3.24. 
132
  Prior to 1976, copyright law did not draw an explicit distinction between the second and third 
notions of ―copies‖ for infringement purposes.  As one commentator describing the state of affairs under 
the 1909 Act explained: 
It would seem that a copy involves the conception that it must have some degree of permanency or 
the maxim de minimis would apply.  Thus, while the making of a single copy may be infringe-
ment, if this copy were destroyed almost as soon as made, as, for example, if a vaudeville artist 
drew with colored chalks, or if a verse were cast upon a screen through a stereopticon, it may be 
doubted whether such a temporary production could fairly be called a copy. 
ARTHUR W. WEIL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 406 (1917). 
133
  See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (―A work is ‗fixed‘ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodi-
ment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or sta-
ble to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than 
transitory duration.‖ (emphasis added)).  
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duration are copies, and those that do not are mere ephemera.  But the pre-
cise contours of the transitory duration requirement remain largely ob-
scured.  In order to avoid a common law process mired in arbitrary 
durational line drawing, courts need more concrete guidance.  Three sets of 
considerations might offer courts that much needed direction.  First, be-
cause ―copies‖ and ―fixed‖ were defined for subject matter purposes, their 
application in the copyrightability context might provide some guidance.  
Second, a handful of courts discussing these definitions in the infringement 
context have suggested that ―transitory duration‖ requires consideration of 
not only the temporal longevity of an instantiation but qualitative factors re-
lating to the manner and purpose of their creation as well.134  Third, courts 
might focus on the degree to which RAM instantiations served as functional 
substitutes for longer lasting fixed copies.  
1. Copyrightability & Fixation.—Because Congress defined ―cop-
ies‖ and ―fixed‖ to clarify copyright‘s subject matter, one might expect the 
interpretation of those terms in disputes over copyrightability to inform our 
understanding of ―transitory duration.‖  However, virtually no reported de-
cisions analyze the statute‘s transitory duration clause in the copyrightabili-
ty context.135  In part, the simultaneous fixation provision explains this 
dearth of cases.  By ensuring that commercially valuable broadcasts are 
considered fixed so long as they are recorded simultaneously with their 
transmission, Congress rendered the bulk of likely litigation over fixation 
unnecessary.136  
Given the lack of relevant case law, any effort to rely on the scope of 
copyrightable subject matter to inform our reading of ―transitory duration‖ 
must build from first principles.  The fixation requirement serves two pri-
mary functions in the copyright system, purposes that could help to illumi-
nate the contours of the durational requirement.  
 
 
 
134
  See, e.g., CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc. 373 F.3d 544, 551 (4th Cir. 2004) (describing the 
transitory duration inquiry as involving both quantitative and qualitative considerations).  
135
  A number of early video game cases rejected arguments by defendants that the games at issue 
were not sufficiently fixed because their audiovisual displays were generated each time the games were 
played.  These courts determined that the games were fixed, although not in a form immediately percept-
ible without the operation of a machine.  These cases did not reach the question of whether the screen 
displays themselves were of sufficient duration to be independently copyrightable.  See, e.g., Williams 
Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int‘l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 
(2d Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int‘l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff‟d 704 F.2d 
1009 (7th Cir. 1983).  
136
  The very need for the simultaneous fixation exception provides some insight into the proper un-
derstanding of ―fixed.‖  A live television broadcast is capable of being perceived or reproduced regard-
less of whether it is simultaneously fixed by the copyright holder.  If the ability to perceive, reproduce, 
or otherwise communicate a work were enough to satisfy the fixation requirement, there would be no 
need for the simultaneous fixation provision.  That exception to the general rule for fixation therefore 
further undermines Peak‘s hard RAM copy doctrine.  But because the images and sounds of a live 
broadcast persist only instantaneously, this exception does not help locate the outer bounds of ―transito-
ry duration.‖ 
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The first of these functions is evidentiary.  By requiring that protecta-
ble works be committed to a tangible and enduring form, copyright avoids 
problems of proof that would otherwise stymie enforcement efforts.137  
Fixation clarifies questions of authorship and ownership, and it defines the 
bounds of the copyright grant through reference to a stable instantiation that 
can be compared to alleged infringements.  If unfixed works could be pro-
tected, ―copyright law would forever be mired in disputes over the defini-
tion and boundaries of the works claiming copyright protection.‖138 
Second, fixation helps to ensure that the copyright system serves its 
constitutional objective.  The Constitution enables Congress to enact copy-
right legislation not to reward authors but ―to promote the progress of 
science.‖139  The exclusive rights provided by copyright law are intended as 
an incentive for authors to create works and disseminate them publicly, in-
itially under the strictures of copyright and later freely within the public 
domain.  Public dissemination and construction of the public domain are 
central to the encouragement of knowledge and learning that animates cop-
yright law140 and represent half of the implicit quid pro quo of the copyright 
system.  Authors are granted exclusive rights in exchange for the promise 
that their works will be available to the public.  By ensuring that works are 
captured in some lasting form, copyright law encourages authors to express 
their ideas on paper, where they can be preserved, copied, and dissemi-
nated—thus enriching the public domain and promoting progress.141 
If fixation serves these two purposes, ―transitory duration‖ should be 
interpreted with them in mind.  To the extent an embodiment is so evanes-
cent that it impedes the goals of fixation, its duration is transient.  This 
standard, of course, does not require permanence.  All physical embodi-
ments decay over time.  Books are vulnerable to mold and insects;142 film is 
subject to chemical deterioration;143 and even modern digital storage media 
 
 
 
137
  See Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 730–34 (2003) (dis-
cussing evidentiary functions of fixation).  
138
  Gregory S. Donat, Note, Fixing Fixation: A Copyright with Teeth for Improvisational Perfor-
mers, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1400 (1997); see also Lichtman, supra note 137, at 730–34; Russ VerS-
teeg, Jurimetric Copyright: Future Shock for the Visual Arts, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 125, 132 
(1995) (discussing the practical problem of proof addressed by fixation). 
139
  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
140
  See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (noting copyright‘s pur-
pose of ―promoting broad public availability‖). 
141
  See, e.g., Joseph C. Merschman, Note, Anchoring Copyright Laws in the Copyright Clause: 
Halting the Commerce Clause End Run Around Limits on Congress‟s Copyright Power, 34 CONN. L. 
REV. 661, 681 (2002) (noting that the fixation requirement is critical to the bargain between society and 
copyright holders). 
142
  HARRY MILLER LYDENBERG & JOHN ARCHER, THE CARE AND REPAIR OF BOOKS 17–26 (1945). 
143
  LIBRARY OF CONG., REDEFINING FILM PRESERVATION: A NATIONAL PLAN 1 (1994), available 
at http://www.loc.gov/film/plan.html (describing the dangers posed to ―old films from nitrate deteriora-
tion and newer films from color fading and the ‗vinegar syndrome‘‖). 
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break down over time.144  Although these media deteriorate, they typically 
persist long enough to achieve the aims of fixation.  
Bronze, print, and film can be contrasted with more fleeting means of 
representing a work.  Text scrawled on a frosted windowpane,145 skywriting, 
sand castles, and ice sculptures are all examples of inherently temporary in-
stantiations.  Given the characteristics of these media, they are suspect can-
didates for fixation.  Embodiments that typically survive for only a few 
minutes or a few hours appear unlikely to qualify as fixed when measured 
against the underlying purposes of the fixation requirement.  Such short-
lived media will not generally provide reliable evidence of the bounds of 
copyrighted expression, nor will they enable dissemination and preservation 
of the author‘s contribution to public discourse. 
A couple of examples may help illustrate this point.  The Polaroid in-
stant camera, introduced in 1947, allows photographers to capture an image 
that develops on special film over the course of a minute.146  Imagine a 
technology that works much like the Polaroid, but in reverse.  A photo cap-
tured on film appears immediately, but fades to black in the span of several 
minutes.  The photographer‘s work is embodied in tangible form for a short 
time.  But without being reproduced in some more stable form, that instan-
tiation cannot serve as evidence of infringement, nor can it contribute to the 
progress of science in the sense the Framers intended.147  As a result, it 
should be considered transitory in duration and unfixed.148 
To take a more commonplace example, consider email.  Typically, as 
we draft an email message, its contents are contained in RAM.  Unless that 
message is saved as a draft or sent to a recipient, it is not retained in any 
 
 
 
144
  JEFF ROTHENBERG, AVOIDING TECHNOLOGICAL QUICKSAND: FINDING A VIABLE TECHNICAL 
FOUNDATION FOR DIGITAL PRESERVATION 2 (1999), http://www.clir.org/pubs/reports/rothenberg/ 
pub77.pdf (noting that ―the physical lifetimes of digital storage media are often surprisingly short‖). 
145
  See Ira L. Brandriss, Writing in Frost on a Window Pane: Email and Chatting on RAM and 
Copyright Fixation, 43 J. COPYRIGHT SOC‘Y U.S.A. 237, 237 (1996) (arguing that RAM instantiations 
are insufficiently permanent to be considered fixed for copyrightability purposes); see also Donald M. 
Millinger, Copyright and the Fine Artist, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 354, 359 (1980) (suggesting that site 
specific art installations that ―last only a few days or weeks‖ fail to satisfy the fixation requirement); 
Joan Infarinato, Note, Copyright Protection for Short-Lived Works of Art, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 90, 112 
(1982) (expressing uncertainty as to whether works lasting three months are sufficiently fixed). 
146
  Tony Long, „Feb. 21, 1947: Take a Polaroid‟ Enters the English Language, WIRED.COM, Feb. 
21, 2008, http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2008/02/dayintech_0221. 
147
  We might also question the extent to which the authors of such short-lived works want or require 
copyright protection.  In this sense a stable fixation may serve as a useful gauge for whether copyright 
exclusivity is necessary to incentivize creation.  See Brandriss, supra note 145, at 242–44. 
148
  But see Patterson v. Century Prods., Inc., 93 F.2d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 1937) (suggesting that ―a 
painting reproduced in colors that quickly faded to leave the canvas blank would, when the reproduction 
was complete, be a copy regardless of its life as such‖).  In Patterson, the court held that the unautho-
rized exhibition of a motion picture constituted a ―copy‖ under the Copyright Act of 1909, which in-
cluded no general right of public performance.  Id. at 492–93.  To the extent the Second Circuit‘s 
reading of ―copy‖ under the 1909 Act bears on the proper understanding of that term under the 1976 
Act, the court‘s earlier reading appears to have been implicitly rejected in Cartoon Network. 
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long-term storage medium such as a hard drive.  If an author decides to dis-
card a draft email rather than send or save it, one can argue persuasively 
that fixation did not occur.  A message stored in RAM is automatically 
overwritten as the computer uses its limited resources for other tasks.149  
That temporary RAM instantiation, as a result, cannot serve the evidentiary 
and progress promotion functions of fixation.  Whether the draft email re-
mains open on the author‘s desktop for an hour or a day, this conclusion 
appears equally appropriate. 
If presented with a sufficient number of disputes over fixation, one 
should expect courts to rely on the typical characteristics of a given medium 
rather than burdensome and potentially inconsistent determinations in each 
individual case.  While this mode of analysis will serve courts well in the 
majority of cases, courts cannot rely solely on the medium of embodiment 
in all cases.  Outliers on both ends of the fixation spectrum are likely to 
arise.  Works embodied in generally stable media may deteriorate unexpec-
tedly.  For example, consider a cast bronze sculpture destroyed by a natural 
disaster just seconds after its creation.  Although bronze would indicate 
more than sufficient fixation in most instances, an embodiment destroyed so 
quickly—regardless of medium—cannot serve the functions of fixation.150  
By the same token, outliers of the opposite sort are likely to arise.  Occasio-
nally, a work embodied in a typically evanescent medium may persist for an 
unusually long time.  If a particular reverse Polaroid image or draft email 
persists for an atypical duration—months or years, for example—these out-
lier cases should be considered on their particular and peculiar facts.  
Analyzing fixation from the perspective of copyrightability offers 
some insights into the transitory duration analysis.  Works embodied in 
physical form that fail to enable the evidentiary and progress promotion 
functions should not qualify as fixed.  These two functions of fixation offer 
some broad guidance in locating the temporal line dividing fixed and un-
fixed instantiations.  If the standards for copyrightability are any guide, that 
distinction should not turn on differences of seconds, minutes, or even 
hours.  Such embodiments are all poorly suited to serve the functions of 
fixation and therefore equally transitory in duration.  Nonetheless, if RAM 
instantiations persist for an atypically long period of time, classification as 
copies appears more appropriate. 
2. Qualitative Factors.—Although the copyrightability considera-
tions discussed above effectively push the durational inquiry towards draw-
ing distinctions on the basis of days, weeks, or months rather than seconds, 
minutes, or hours, anything approaching a precise durational limit will re-
quire greater common law development.  The question of transitory dura-
 
 
 
149
  See MUELLER, supra note 10, at 416–17. 
150
  Admittedly, an approach that would result in inconsistent protection for authors who took iden-
tical steps to achieve fixation could be characterized as unfair.  But without the public benefits of fixa-
tion, the copyright grant under such circumstances would be entirely one-sided. 
104:1067  (2010) Fixing RAM Copies 
 1097 
tion is not a matter of pure durational line drawing, however.  A number of 
courts considering fixation in the infringement context have considered 
qualitative factors as a supplement to quantitative ones.  These decisions 
stress the importance of functional attributes in determining whether an in-
stantiation is fixed. 
One case, Mura v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., addressed the 
problem of fixation well before the enactment of the Copyright Act of 
1976.151  Mura considered a claim under the 1909 Act arising out of the use 
of hand puppets on a children‘s television program.  Mura created and sold 
a line of copyrighted hand puppets.152  The producers of ―The Captain Kan-
garoo Show‖ purchased some of these puppets and used them on air with-
out Mura‘s explicit consent.153  Mura sued for infringement, offering 
evidence that the puppets appeared on screen for thirty-five seconds in one 
instance and for ―several minutes‖ on a later occasion.154  Although each in-
dividual image of the puppets lasted only a small fraction of a second when 
broadcast,155 Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) created a permanent 
kinescope recording of the shorter appearance.156 
Because the 1909 Act included no general public display right, the 
court focused on reproduction.157  According to the court, the relevant ques-
tion was whether ―the presentation on the television program, by an image 
reproduction of a transitory and impermanent nature [was] a copying of the 
puppets.‖158  The court concluded that the ―evanescent reproduction‖ of the 
puppet on screen was ―so different in nature from the copyrighted hand 
puppet that . . . it [was] not a copy.‖159 
The court‘s conclusion reflects both a quantitative judgment about the 
length of the on-screen instantiations and a qualitative concern over the ex-
tent to which those instantiations served a function comparable to the pup-
pets themselves.  Because the images on screen were so dissimilar from a 
functional perspective, the court concluded they were not copies.  Whether 
this substitutability analysis is better conceptualized as a component of the 
legal copying inquiry or the question of fixation is difficult to discern.  Be-
cause the 1909 Act did not define ―copies‖ and ―fixed,‖ those two questions 
were less distinct.  More fundamentally, the functional equivalence and du-
rational considerations are deeply intertwined.  The fact that evanescent im-
 
 
 
151
  245 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
152
  Id. at 588. 
153
  Id. 
154
  Id. at 588–89. 
155
  Id. at 589. 
156
  Id. at 588.  The court largely ignored this undoubtedly fixed copy of the broadcast on the 
grounds that it was never commercially exploited by CBS.  Id. 
157
  See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075–76 (1909). 
158
  Mura, 245 F. Supp. at 589. 
159
  Id. at 590. 
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ages of puppets are not functionally comparable to actual hand puppets is 
partly a reflection of the short lifespan of those on-screen images. 
More recent courts have noted the importance of functionality in the 
―transitory duration‖ analysis under the 1976 Act.  The district court‘s deci-
sion in Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., a case decided in 
the immediate wake of Peak, suggested that the focus on temporal duration 
should give way to consideration of ―what [a] copy does, and what it is ca-
pable of doing, while it exists.‖160  According to the court, ―‗[t]ransitory du-
ration‘ is a relative term that must be interpreted and applied in context.‖161  
Applying this standard, the Triad court concluded that the RAM instantia-
tion at issue was ―the functional equivalent of a longer lasting copy‖ and 
was therefore fixed.162 
Courts are also concerned with the ways in which technologies create, 
manipulate, and use temporary instantiations.  CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loop-
Net, Inc. offers one example.163  CoStar involved claims of direct copyright 
infringement against the provider of a website that enabled users to upload 
photos of real estate.  CoStar maintained an extensive database of commer-
cial real estate listings, including its copyrighted images of properties.164  
LoopNet operated a website that enabled real estate brokers to post property 
listings.165  Some of LoopNet‘s users included CoStar photographs in their 
listings without CoStar‘s permission.166  CoStar maintained that by storing 
these photos on its servers and transmitting them to Internet users, LoopNet 
engaged in direct infringement.167 
The Fourth Circuit rejected CoStar‘s infringement claim, relying large-
ly on its determination that LoopNet—much like Cablevision in its dispute 
with Cartoon Network—did not volitionally engage in copying.168  If copies 
were made, LoopNet‘s users made them.  While LoopNet could face indi-
rect infringement claims to the extent it facilitated infringement, the court 
rejected CoStar‘s direct infringement theory.169 
This lack of volition aside, the court questioned whether the alleged 
copies created using the LoopNet site were fixed.  The court expressed deep 
skepticism about whether data stored automatically in RAM during the 
transmission of listings to Internet users persisted for more than a transitory 
 
 
 
160
  No. C 92 1539-FMS, 1994 WL 446049, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1994), aff‟d in part, rev‟d in 
part, 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995). 
161
  Id. 
162
  Id.  But see infra Part III.B. 
163
  373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004). 
164
  Id. at 546. 
165
  Id. at 547. 
166
  Id. 
167
  Id. at 548 
168
  Id. at 550. 
169
  Id. at 549–50.  CoStar included an indirect infringement claim in its complaint, but the parties 
later stipulated to its dismissal.  Id. at 547.  
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duration.  According to the Fourth Circuit, these RAM instantiations were 
―a temporary, automatic response to the user‘s request‖ and ―function[ed] 
solely to transmit the user‘s data.‖170  The court rejected the notion that in-
stantiations resulting from this process were ―‗fixed‘ in the sense that they 
are ‗of more than transitory duration.‘‖171 
According to the Fourth Circuit, the transitory duration analysis turns 
on both qualitative and quantitative considerations.  The qualitative compo-
nent looks to the functional role of the instantiation, the purpose it serves in 
the overall system, and the means by which it carries out that function.  The 
quantitative component is concerned with ―the period during which the 
function occurs.‖172 
Cartoon Network also hinted at an underlying concern with the func-
tional aspects of fixation.  In determining that RS-DVR buffer instantiations 
were not copies, the Second Circuit noted that the buffer data was automati-
cally overwritten.173  The court‘s efforts to draw causal connections between 
each buffer instantiation and the purpose it served in the RS-DVR system 
likewise reflects a concern for qualitative considerations.  Although its ap-
proach was less explicit than that of the Costar court, the Second Circuit 
was interested in not only how long buffer data persisted, but also what 
function it served in the RS-DVR system. 
The qualitative dimensions of ―transitory duration‖ offer courts another 
set of tools for differentiating temporary instantiations from fixed copies.  
Although courts have not reached a consensus, instantiations created auto-
matically as a necessary step to some further manipulation of data, or de-
leted after serving their function, appear less likely candidates for fixation.  
Ultimately, these specific characteristics are manifestations of a broader 
concern with the degree to which temporary instantiations serve as func-
tional equivalents of more permanent fixed copies.  As discussed below, a 
fuller treatment of that question requires an understanding of both the pur-
pose of the reproduction right and the work done by the RAM copy doc-
trine. 
 
 
 
170
  Id. at 551. 
171
  Id.  In an effort to reconcile its treatment of RAM instantiations with Peak‘s broad holding, the 
court distinguished the CoStar facts on the grounds that any temporary instantiations created on Loop-
Net‘s servers were used solely to ―automatically receive[] . . . and transmit[]‖ information to users.  Id.  
CoStar maintains that, unlike in Peak, the instantiations did not ―function[] in the service of the comput-
er or its owner.‖  Id. 
CoStar‘s efforts to distinguish its facts underscore the acrobatics that Peak demands from any court 
offering a nuanced analysis of RAM instantiations.  The images at issue in CoStar were unquestionably 
used by LoopNet in creating and operating its site.  Those RAM instantiations ―function[ed] in the ser-
vice‖ of LoopNet, just as instantiations of computer software function in the service of their user.  Id.  
The fact that LoopNet was a passive operator of its server, with no knowledge of the unauthorized na-
ture of its use, might demonstrate its lack of volition, but it is irrelevant to the question of fixation. 
172
  Id. 
173
  Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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3. Functional Equivalence.—A temporary instantiation could func-
tion as the equivalent of a more permanent copy of a work in a number of 
ways.  Like stable copies, temporary instantiations can, to varying degrees, 
enable access, use, distribution, and copying.  But the exclusive right of re-
production is not equally concerned with each of these potential functions 
of copies.  Its aims are more limited. To the extent treating RAM instantia-
tions as copies enables copyright holders to leverage the reproduction right 
to do work unintended by Congress, courts should adopt a narrower under-
standing of functional equivalence.  When courts consider transitory dura-
tion from a qualitative perspective, they should focus on the degree to 
which RAM instantiations serve functions traditionally regulated by the re-
production right.  This subsection considers each of the ways in which 
RAM instantiations might serve functions similar to more permanent copies 
and examines the degree to which the reproduction right concerns itself 
with those functions. 
a. Copies as regulators of access.—Copies enable access to co-
pyrighted works.  Possession of a tangible copy is not a guarantee of access 
to the underlying work,174 and works are sometimes accessible even without 
a copy.175  Nonetheless, copies tend to be a useful proxy for access, and con-
trol over copies helps rights holders enable or restrict access to their works.  
Because digital works cannot be accessed without being loaded into memo-
ry, RAM instantiations offer a similar degree of control over access. 
Some commentators argue that Peak and subsequent RAM copy deci-
sions are best understood as an effort by courts to extend to copyright hold-
ers exclusive rights over access.176  In an environment in which works can 
be exploited without the creation of long-term copies, copyright holders 
have argued that they need a mechanism for asserting control over access.177  
By treating RAM instantiations as copies, courts have allowed copyright 
holders to leverage the reproduction right as a tool to prevent unwanted 
access to their works.  As software and other services increasingly reside on 
remote servers rather than CD-ROMs or local hard drives, copyright hold-
 
 
 
174
  Access to the work contained in a copy, for example, could be restricted through encryption. 
175
  Television and radio broadcasting are examples of enabling access without necessarily creating 
copies. 
176
  See I. Trotter Hardy, Computer RAM “Copies”: Hit or Myth?  Historical Perspectives on Cach-
ing as a Microcosm of Current Copyright Concerns, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 423, 453 (1997) (suggest-
ing that courts have interpreted ―copies‖ to include RAM instantiations as a means of providing an 
exclusive right to ―access and use‖ information). 
177
  For example, the increasing reliance on cloud computing, a model that relies on remotely stored 
data and software accessed by users through the Internet rather than locally stored files, has increased 
copyright-holder concern over the need to regulate access to their works. See Brief for Copyright Al-
liance as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Cable News Network, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, 129 S.Ct. 
2890 (2009) (No. 08-448), 2008 WL 4887717, at *15–16 (noting that economic value can be realized 
from copyrighted works, without distributing stable copies, through application service provider and 
cloud computing business models). 
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ers worry that without a broad RAM copy doctrine, they will be powerless 
to prevent unauthorized access.178 
The equation of RAM instantiations and stable copies on the basis of 
their shared ability to regulate access is problematic for two reasons.  First, 
as the need for a broad RAM copy doctrine as a gap filler suggests, copy-
right has not traditionally afforded rights holders control over access.  The 
reproduction right has certainly not played that role in the analog realm.  
Copyright forbids theatergoers from taping the latest blockbuster, but it 
cannot stop them from sneaking into the theater.179  The shared ability of 
rights holders to regulate access to works offers no independent rationale 
for treating RAM instantiations and copies as functionally equivalent. 
Second, to the extent the desire to restrict access is one that demands a 
response, Congress has acted.  Specific legislative efforts have provided 
rights holders a great deal of protection against unauthorized access.  The 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) guards against the circumven-
tion of technological measures that restrict access to copyrighted works and 
even bans the distribution of technologies that enable such acts of circum-
vention.180  Additionally, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act prevents unau-
thorized access to networked computer resources under certain 
circumstances.181  Given these legislative interventions, there is no need to 
enlist the reproduction right to do work so far beyond its intended scope.  
And to the extent any such need exists, Congress, not the courts, is best po-
sitioned to affect such a fundamental change to the reproduction right. 
b. Copies as regulators of use.—Just as copies serve as proxies 
for access, they also enable copyright holders to regulate particular uses of 
their works.  Without a tangible copy of a play, for example, a theater com-
pany would find it difficult to stage a production.  Likewise, use of digital 
works depends on RAM instantiations.  Classifying those instantiations as 
copies helps copyright holders restrict the uses made of their works. 
However, it is far from clear that such restrictions are the province of 
the reproduction right.  Copyright law has not traditionally regulated the use 
of works through its exclusive right of reproduction.  Instead, copyright re-
lies on rights of public display and performance to control the use of pro-
tected works.182  Importantly, these rights draw an explicit distinction 
between public and private use, permitting exclusivity with regard to the 
former, but leaving the latter unregulated.  Many instances of alleged RAM 
copying could fall within the public display and performance rights, under-
 
 
 
178
  Id. 
179
  See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2319B (2006) (prohibiting the ―[u]nauthorized re-
cording of Motion pictures in a Motion picture exhibition facility‖). 
180
  17 U.S.C. § 1201(a). 
181
  See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (defining circumstances under which accessing a computer is unlawful).  
182
  See Reese, supra note 60, at 84. 
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mining the need for reliance on the reproduction right.183  Only where copy-
right holders target purely private uses would a broad RAM copy doctrine 
be necessary, but these cases are precisely those in which RAM copies 
would subvert the distinction between public and private that Congress has 
embedded in the scope of the copyright grant. 
 The control over use enabled by a broad RAM copy doctrine is partic-
ularly troubling when coupled with the routine enforcement of end-user li-
cense agreements that purport to govern the use of digital works.  A spate of 
recent cases has treated violations of license terms as copyright infringe-
ment on the basis of RAM copying,184 demonstrating the power over the be-
havior of both customers and competitors resulting from this combination. 
MDY Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment185 is one example.  Blizzard 
operates World of Warcraft (WoW), a massively multiplayer online role-
playing game.186  ―WoW players control characters within a virtual un-
iverse, exploring the landscape, fighting monsters, performing quests, 
building skills, and interacting with other players and computer-generated 
characters.‖187  Blizzard‘s end-user license agreement and terms of use spell 
out the rules that govern the use of its WoW software and services.  These 
rules prohibit players from using third-party software that modifies or au-
tomates the in-game experience.188 
MDY developed just such a program.  The Glider, a ―bot‖ that auto-
mates the play of WoW, allowed its users to continue playing while away 
from their computers.189  The Glider thereby enabled users to collect in-
game resources to advance quickly through the ranks within WoW.  Many 
WoW users understandably view such automatic play as cheating, and Bliz-
zard considers the use of bots harmful to the value of its service.190  In re-
sponse, Blizzard sued MDY, alleging contributory and vicarious copyright 
 
 
 
183
  See id. at 144–46. 
184
  See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. C 08-5780 JF (RS), 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 42367, at *12 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2009) (denying a motion to dismiss a copyright infringement 
claim premised on accessing a website for purposes prohibited by the terms of use); MDY Indus., LLC 
v. Blizzard Entm‘t, Inc., No. CV-06-2555-PHX-DGC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53988, at *10–11, 52 (D. 
Ariz. July 14, 2008) (granting summary judgment on a contributory copyright infringement claim 
against a developer of interoperable software premised on the creation of unauthorized RAM copies by 
end users); Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Techs., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1104, 1116–17 (C.D. Cal. 
2007) (finding a strong likelihood of success on claims for direct and contributory copyright infringe-
ment against a developer of automated ticket purchasing software for creating unauthorized RAM copies 
of a ticket vendor‘s website). 
185
  MDY, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53988. 
186
  Id. at *2–3. 
187
  Id. at *2. 
188
  Id. at *12–13, *16.   
189
  Id. at *3–4.   
190
  Id. at *4.   
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infringement, trafficking in circumvention tools in violation of the DMCA, 
tortious interference with contract, and unjust enrichment.191 
Blizzard premised its indirect copyright infringement claims on alleged 
acts of direct infringement by Glider users, a theory embraced by the court.  
According to the court, WoW users who rely on Glider act outside the 
scope of Blizzard‘s license.192  If WoW users take subsequent actions that 
implicate the copyright holders‘ exclusive rights, they are engaged in in-
fringement absent some defense.  Mere use of a work is generally insuffi-
cient to infringe.  However, relying on Peak, the court concluded that 
Glider users created infringing copies when they loaded WoW files into 
RAM.193  In other words, Blizzard‘s terms of use allowed users to create 
RAM instantiations of the WoW software for normal gameplay, but prohi-
bited them from doing so when using bots.  Blizzard maintained that non-
compliance with its terms constituted copyright infringement, and the court 
agreed.194 
Normally, copyright requires something more than breaking the rules 
of a game to support a finding of infringement.  Regardless of your willful 
disregard of the instruction ―Do not pass Go. Do not collect $200,‖ Parker 
Brothers has no colorable infringement case against you.195  But if courts 
agree that license terms spell out the conditions under which use is permit-
ted, and the RAM copy doctrine dictates that use and reproduction are one 
and the same, players who ignore such dictates in the digital world are ex-
posed to potential infringement liability.  This logic requires no reasonable 
connection between the conditions imposed on use and harm to legitimate 
copyright interests.  
Imagine you download a song from your preferred digital music retail-
er, and the license agreement governing that download provides that you 
may listen to the song only if you agree to give it glowing reviews—or for 
that matter, if you agree to wear green on alternating Thursdays.196  If RAM 
instantiations are copies, listening to lawfully acquired music after ignoring 
these speech or dress codes results in not just a breach of contract, but copy-
right infringement.  The practical implications of that distinction are signifi-
cant.  Rather than being forced to prove damages arising from your actions, 
a rights holder could rely on the statutory damages provision of the Copy-
 
 
 
191
  Id. at *5–6.  
192
  Id. at *21. 
193
  Id. at *19. 
194
  Id. at *52.   
195
  Cf. J.F. Wilkinson, The Play-Money Game That Made Millions, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 2, 
1963, at 54 (―You can go up to almost any literate American older than 10 and say: ‗Go directly to jail. 
Do not pass Go.  Do not collect $200,‘ and he will surely know that you are talking about Monopoly.‖). 
196
  Query whether the average consumer would be aware of his assent to such conditions.  The 
terms currently governing use of the iTunes Store weigh in at roughly 15,000 words.  See Terms and 
Conditions, APPLE INC., http://www.apple.com/legal/itunes/us/terms.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2010). 
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right Act, which provides for damages up to $150,000 per work infringed,197 
as well as the generally permissive approach to injunctive relief in copy-
right cases.198 
Copyright does not provide rights holders exclusivity over reproduc-
tion as a means of enabling control over particular uses of their works.  
Even though a broad RAM copying rule is an effective tool for exercising 
such control, it would permit rights holders much greater power over pri-
vate uses than copyright has traditionally conferred or Congress intended.  
As a result, courts should not be persuaded by claims that RAM instantia-
tions, like more permanent copies, enable use of copyrighted works.199 
c. Copies as regulators of distribution.—A third function copies 
serve is to enable distribution.  In contrast to access or use, the regulation of 
distribution shares a closer connection to the reproduction right.  As a statu-
tory matter, the distribution right is expressly limited to the sale, rental, 
lease, lending, or other transfer of copies.200  From a practical perspective, 
one reason copyright law might concern itself with reproduction is that the 
creation of copies could serve as a precursor to infringing distributions.  In 
this sense, reproduction is closely tied to one of the core exclusive rights of 
the copyright grant.201 
Of course, the distribution right itself gives rights holders a more direct 
means of vindicating their interests.  But the initial creation of copies could 
sometimes prove a more effective chokepoint for enforcement efforts than 
the distribution stage.  For large-scale infringers, and particularly in a pre-
digital era, reproduction was a more centralized operation while distribution 
was comparatively diffuse and more difficult to target effectively.  At the 
very least, there is a plausible relationship between restricting reproduction 
and maintaining exclusivity over distribution. 
To the extent temporary instantiations give rise to a threat of unautho-
rized distribution comparable to that posed by traditional copies, courts 
might have good reason to treat them as the functional equivalents of long-
 
 
 
197
  See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006) (providing for damages ranging from $750 to $30,000 per in-
fringed work absent a showing of willfulness, and up to $150,000 per work in cases of willful infringe-
ment).  For a criticism of the size and unpredictability of statutory damages in copyright law, see Pamela 
Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (2009). 
198
  See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 129, at § 14.06[A][1][b] (describing the issuance of pre-
liminary injunctions in copyright infringement actions as ―ordinary, even commonplace‖). 
199
  See, e.g., Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., No. C 92 1539-FMS, 1994 WL 446049, at *5 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1994) (finding that a RAM instantiation was ―the functional equivalent of a longer 
lasting copy‖ because it enabled use of software). 
200
  See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). 
201
  See Paul Edward Geller, Beyond the Copyright Crisis: Principles for Change, 55 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC‘Y 165, 173–74 (2008) (arguing that the right of reproduction is an important component of the cop-
yright grant, ―but only to the extent that creations continue to be exploited in the guise of hard copies‖ 
through, for example, distribution). 
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er-lasting copies.  But RAM instantiations present very little threat of unau-
thorized distribution.  Since they reside in the memory of a computing de-
vice until overwritten and only as long as the device maintains power,202 
RAM instantiations would prove difficult and expensive for infringers to 
distribute.  Moreover, the volatility of RAM instantiations would render 
them of limited value to the public.  In short, RAM is a strikingly imprac-
tical distribution medium.  As a result, no realistic assessment of RAM in-
stantiations could consider them equivalent to more permanent copies for 
the purposes of distribution. 
d. Copies as regulators of reproduction.—Finally, copies enable 
copying.  Though by no means necessary, tangible embodiments are often 
useful in reproducing faithful copies of a work.  If the exclusive right to re-
produce prevents the creation of an initial copy, it effectively guards against 
downstream copies arising from that first generation reproduction.  
Like traditional fixed copies, an instantiation in RAM is capable of be-
ing reproduced in a lasting form.  This ability to give rise to subsequent 
copies is sometimes cited as a reason to classify RAM instantiations as cop-
ies.203  But the ability to create a copy from an instantiation alone is not a 
sufficient condition for classification as a fixed copy.  If it were, the distinc-
tion between the work and its tangible embodiment would collapse.  Intel-
lectual conceptions are capable of being transformed into tangible copies, 
but they are not themselves copies by virtue of that fact. 
Nonetheless, the ability to generate downstream copies is one sense in 
which RAM instantiations and fixed copies could share functional similari-
ty.  But as a factual matter, they differ in the extent to which they allow for 
successive copying.  Because of their volatile nature, RAM instantiations 
pose less of a threat of repeated prospective copying.  Compared to more 
durable fixed copies, temporary instantiations are likely to be copied far 
fewer times. 
One may object that RAM instantiations yield perfect digital copies.  
Further, if those perfect copies are durable, the total number of reproduc-
tions resulting from a single RAM instantiation over several generations is 
comparable to a fixed copy.  But this objection points to a separate reason 
to question the need for a broad RAM copy doctrine.  If RAM instantiations 
need to be regulated because they give rise to fixed copies that are them-
selves dangerous to copyright interests, the simplest solution is to target 
these admittedly fixed downstream copies.  This approach avoids an overly 
elastic notion of ―copies‖ that would allow rights holder to restrict RAM in-
stantiations for reasons unrelated to downstream reproduction.  After all, 
 
 
 
202
  See MUELLER, supra note 10, at 417. 
203
  See, e.g., Brief of Plaintiffs-Counterclaim-Defendants-Appellees at 49–50, Cartoon Network LP 
v. CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (Nos. 07-1480-cv(L), 07-1511-cv(CON)), 2007 WL 
6101601 (arguing that the buffer copies in the RS-DVR Service are ―fixed‖ because ―they exist long 
enough to be reproduced‖ into more permanent copies). 
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concerns over serial reproduction have hardly been the driving force moti-
vating RAM copy litigation.  To the extent downstream reproduction of 
RAM instantiations presents a genuine threat to copyright holders, an equal-
ly effective solution consistent with a more limited reading of ―copies‖ is 
available. 
On the whole, RAM instantiations are poor substitutes for durable cop-
ies.  Copyright holders are justified in their concern that unauthorized cop-
ies of works will undermine the commercial value of their works.  
Unauthorized fixed copies typically function as near perfect substitutes for 
legitimate copies.  They can be accessed, used, distributed, and copied to 
the same degree and for the same duration as a lawfully made copy.  How-
ever, RAM instantiations do not share these qualities.204  Unlike durable 
copies, RAM instantiations have limited commercial value, and the primary 
value they do offer—temporarily enabling access and use—is protected 
through federal legislation and state contract law independent of the defini-
tion of ―copies‖ and ―fixed.‖  Treating RAM instantiations as copies unne-
cessarily conscripts the reproduction right to do work unanticipated by the 
Copyright Act and unintended by Congress. 
C. Evaluating RAM Instantiations  
By mapping the contours of the ―transitory duration‖ clause of the de-
finition of fixation, we can draw some general conclusions to help courts 
evaluate future RAM instantiations and avoid uncertainty in the wake of 
Cartoon Network.  These considerations by no means reduce the question 
of the status of temporary instantiations to a simple algorithm.  However, 
they do offer some rough guidelines that simplify an otherwise potentially 
bewildering inquiry. 
First, if copyrightability is any guide, durational distinctions of 
seconds, minutes, or even hours should not be determinative.  If an instan-
tiation that endures for 1.2 seconds is not fixed, a few additional moments 
should not change that conclusion, all other things being equal.  Although 
this rule of thumb does not identify a precise line dividing fixed and unfixed 
instantiations, it does suggest that some courts have been unnecessarily par-
simonious in drawing temporal distinctions.205 
 
 
 
204
  See London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 175 n.29 (D. Mass. 2008) (deter-
mining that electronic phonorecords obtained from peer to peer services ―precisely to be copies, indefi-
nitely replayable and transferable‖ were fixed).  But the London-Sire court recognized ―that electronic 
copies can be of varying permanence . . . and it is not clear that all of them should be treated equally un-
der the copyright statutes.‖  Id. (citing MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518–19 
(9th Cir. 1993)).  
205
  See, e.g., SimplexGrinnell LP v. Integrated Sys. & Power, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 167, 189 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding a copy created when software was loaded into RAM for ―several minutes to 
several hours‖); Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 363 (E.D. Va. 1994) 
(suggesting that RAM instantiations persisting for ―seconds or fractions of a second . . . arguably would 
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Second, these temporal considerations generally do not require case-
by-case evaluation.  Instead, courts should focus on the typical characteris-
tics of the medium in which an instantiation is embodied.  This approach 
eases the burdens on courts and offers copyright holders and technology 
developers greater predictability.  But if a particular instantiation proves an 
outlier by enduring for far longer than its medium would suggest, more 
careful consideration of its temporal duration is warranted. 
Third, courts should consider qualitative factors in addition to temporal 
ones.  Certain concrete qualitative indicia should weigh against finding that 
an instantiation is fixed.  These criteria include the fact that an instantiation 
is necessary to operate a machine or system; that it is created automatically 
in the operation of that machine or system; and that it is deleted after serv-
ing that function.  More broadly, the qualitative analysis should focus on 
the degree to which instantiations serve as functional substitutes for more 
permanent copies.  In considering functional equivalence, courts should 
bear in mind that the reproduction right was not designed to provide copy-
right holders exclusive control over every interaction with their works. 
Evaluated under these standards for fixation, most RAM instantiations 
fare poorly.  Their typically brief existence falls short of any duration that 
would support an unequivocal claim to fixation.  Qualitatively, RAM in-
stantiations are often, though not always, created automatically as a neces-
sary step in the operation of a machine or system.  And as a general rule, 
they are poor functional substitutes for persistent copies. 
This assessment tends to vindicate the Second Circuit‘s intuitive judg-
ment in Cartoon Network.  The RS-DVR buffer instantiations in that case 
were in many respects representative of RAM copies generally.  They were 
short-lived, functionally necessary, and no replacement for enduring copies.  
Although the facts of Cartoon Network revealed the contrasts between fixed 
copies and temporary instantiations in sharp relief, most RAM instantia-
tions differ from the RS-DVR buffer data in degree, not in kind.  Moreover, 
this assessment further undermines both the reasoning and the outcomes in 
Peak and its progeny.  The particular characteristics of the alleged copies in 
those cases offer no reason to deviate from the general conclusions about 
the status of RAM instantiations.  Although their duration was marginally 
longer, such temporal differences alone cannot justify treating the instantia-
tions at issue in those cases as copies. 
But the preceding analysis does not demand an inflexible rule that 
RAM instantiations are never copies.  Under certain circumstances, data 
stored in RAM could be properly described as fixed.  If a particular RAM 
instantiation persisted far longer than is typical, perhaps for weeks or 
months, a careful consideration of the individual facts of that case would be 
necessary.  Such an aberrant duration would alter both the temporal and qu-
                                                                                                                           
be too ephemeral to be considered ‗fixed‘ or a ‗copy‘‖ while those persisting for ―minutes or longer‖ are 
copies).  
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alitative considerations, requiring the court to think carefully about the ex-
tent to which that instantiation served as a functional substitute for more 
traditional fixed copies.  But such cases are likely to be rare.  In the vast 
majority of cases RAM instantiations are neither ―fixed‖ nor ―copies‖ as the 
Copyright Act defines those terms. 
CONCLUSION 
Copyright has long struggled to understand how the fundamental con-
cept of the copy should apply to temporary digital instantiations.  Due to 
early judicial missteps, the debate has understandably focused on the flaws 
of a broad and inflexible RAM copy doctrine.  Partly in response to these 
criticisms, courts appear on the precipice of a new mode of analyzing RAM 
instantiations.  Cartoon Network took the first tentative steps in this direc-
tion.  The Second Circuit distanced itself from Peak without openly reject-
ing it, recognizing the need for a new paradigm without endeavoring to 
articulate it fully. 
This Essay has attempted to make the inner workings of a new RAM 
instantiation analysis less opaque.  Although the Copyright Act is silent on 
the precise meaning of ―transitory duration,‖ courts need not throw up their 
hands and ignore that language altogether, as the Ninth Circuit did in Peak, 
or rely on unpredictable instinctive assessments, as the Second Circuit ar-
guably did in Cartoon Network.  By understanding the quantitative and qua-
litative elements of transitory duration, courts can shift their focus from the 
metaphysical question of when a copy exists to a set of tangible inquiries 
into the duration and function of temporary instantiations.  Courts can draw 
from these inquiries a set of reliable general conclusions that leave room for 
potential outliers yet avoid a burdensome case-by-case analysis of the cha-
racteristics of every RAM instantiation.  Like Peak‘s blanket rule, these 
guidelines offer predictability.  Unlike Peak, this approach maintains some 
degree of flexibility and accurately reflects the language of the Copyright 
Act. 
Given our increasingly digital environment, the status of RAM instan-
tiations will continue to have profound implications for the scope of copy-
right law.  The foundation of Peak‘s RAM copy doctrine—the current 
dominant approach among courts—is at best unsteady.  Cartoon Network, 
despite its reluctance to reject Peak outright, has served to further expose 
Peak‘s vulnerabilities.  But copyright law must develop a reliable and pre-
dictable standard to finally replace Peak.  The suggestions offered here are 
intended to inform this new judicial approach to RAM instantiations. 
 
 
